DirectDemocracyS
Direct democracy · Shared leadership · Collective ownership
NATIONAL DDS PROGRAM FOR CHAD
Political, economic, financial and social program — Critical analysis of the current situation and comprehensive proposal for the implementation of the DirectDemocracyS system in the Republic of Chad
"The wealth of each nation and the power to decide its own destiny must remain, forever, solely in the hands of its people."
— Founding principle of DirectDemocracyS, applied in every country of the world
Document written in French, the official and administrative working language of the Republic of Chad
Preamble.............................. 1
Methodology and founding principles of DirectDemocracyS............... 1
Logic and common sense as a method...................... 1
Research and truth versus disinformation.................... 1
Competence: governing with specialists, not slogans.............................. 1
Mutual respect and unconditional protection of minorities........................... 1
Critical analysis of the current situation in Chad................... 1
Political and institutional situation............................. 1
Economic and financial situation............................. 1
Social and humanitarian situation............................. 1
The DirectDemocracyS system: principles and architecture applied to Chad 1
Fractal microgroups: the basic unit of direct democracy........................ 1
ddsAI and allddsAI: complete, neutral and incorruptible information... 1
NTCO and GUMI-SV: Operational Coordination and Global Economic Architecture of DDS.......... 1
Political program for Chad.... 1
Specific diagnosis and policy objectives................ 1
Gradual establishment of DDS micro-groups across Chadian territory............... 1
Protection and explicit inclusion of all political sensitivities........................ 1
Peaceful management of intercommunal conflicts and regional diversity........ 1
Gradual and secure institutional reform............ 1
Concrete examples and anticipated consequences 1
Economic and financial program for Chad................. 1
Transparent and citizen-led management of public debt.......................................... 1
Gradual formalization and protection of the informal sector................................ 1
Financial inclusion and banking stability in service of citizens.......................... 1
A fairer tax system, based on verifiable trust.............. 1
Concrete examples and anticipated consequences 1
Social program for Chad...... 1
Education: Moving beyond one of Africa's lowest literacy rates...................... 1
Health and nutrition: responding to an emergency affecting two million children.................. 1
Women, children and the fight against violence........ 1
Security, peace and the fight against extremism in the Lake Chad Basin........ 1
Climate and environment: protecting Lake Chad and agricultural land................ 1
Concrete examples and anticipated consequences 1
Implementation: Phased roadmap for Chad................ 1
Phase 3 — Provincial-scale fractal expansion (months 18 to 36)............................ 1
Protection against manipulation and security of DDS platforms...................... 1
The Chadian context: a terrain particularly exposed to disinformation............... 1
ddsAI as a bulwark against disinformation.................... 1
Technical security of DDS platforms........................... 1
Protection against external interference and organized manipulation campaigns... 1
Conclusion............................ 1
Preamble
This document constitutes the complete national program of DirectDemocracyS (DDS) for the Republic of Chad. It is intended primarily for the Chadian people — in all their ethnic, linguistic, religious and regional diversity — as well as for any person, organization, institution or government wishing to understand how a system of direct, comprehensive and peaceful democracy can resolve, in a concrete and sustainable way, the structural problems that Chad has experienced since its independence.
This document is not an abstract statement of intent. It is structured according to the DDS method: a rigorous, honest, and uncompromising analysis of the country's current reality, followed by a detailed, concrete, and verifiable program, point by point, with specific examples, implementation mechanisms, and the expected consequences of each measure. Nothing is left vague. Every identified problem receives an explicit solution; every solution is linked to the overall architecture of the DDS system, which has been designed to be applied, with the necessary adaptations, in all countries of the world, regardless of their current political regime.
DirectDemocracyS is neither a political party in the classical sense, nor a non-governmental organization, nor a revolutionary movement in the violent sense of the term. DDS is a comprehensive and alternative system of governance — political, economic, financial and social — based on three inseparable pillars: direct democracy (every citizen truly decides, permanently, and no longer just every four or seven years), shared leadership (“leadership condivisa”, that is to say the absence of single leaders, presidents for life or ruling dynasties, replaced by a collective, rotating and meritocratic leadership), and non-transferable collective ownership (each official member holds an equal and non-transferable share of the common heritage, which makes it structurally impossible for a minority to capture national wealth).
"We ask no permission from any established power to give back to the people what already belongs to them: their voice, their wealth, and their future."
Methodology and founding principles of DirectDemocracyS
All of DDS's actions — and therefore all the content of this program for Chad — are based on five non-negotiable principles, applied without exception and without distinction of country, culture or political regime: logic, common sense, thorough study of reality, truth, and competence, all framed by an absolute requirement of mutual respect between all human beings, regardless of their origin, religion, ethnicity, political opinion or social status.
Logic and common sense as a method
DDS rejects ready-made ideologies, demagogic promises, and imported solutions that are not adapted to local realities. Every proposal in this document has been developed through logical deduction based on observations made on the ground in Chad: oil dependence, geographical isolation, extreme ethnolinguistic diversity, demographic and migratory pressures, and fragile institutions. Common sense dictates that we should never propose a reform that ignores these realities, nor should we claim that a change of regime alone will solve problems whose causes are structural, economic, and institutional.
Research and truth versus disinformation
None of the proposals in this program are based on assumptions. Every diagnosis presented in Part II of this document is grounded in the analysis of the most recent available economic, social, and political data on Chad, cross-checked and verified. DDS believes that telling the truth about the real state of a country—even when that truth is difficult for its leaders or a segment of its population to hear—is the absolute prerequisite for any serious reform. For this reason, this document flatters neither the current regime in N'Djamena nor any particular opposition force: it describes what is, in order to build what should be.
Competence: governing with specialists, not slogans.
DDS replaces the logic of personal power—one man, one clan, one party deciding for everyone—with the logic of collective competence. In each area (health, agriculture, water resources, energy, education, security, diplomacy, public finance), the decisions of Chadian DDS micro-groups will be informed by groups of specialists and by the neutral artificial intelligence tools ddsAI and allddsAI, described in detail in Part III. Competence never eliminates popular sovereignty: it informs it, it never replaces it.
Mutual respect and unconditional protection of minorities
Chad is one of the world's most ethnically and linguistically diverse countries: over two hundred ethnic groups, more than one hundred and twenty living languages, two major religious traditions (Muslim and Christian) coexisting with traditional animist practices, and a historical divide between a predominantly Sahelian and Arabic-speaking North and East and a predominantly Sudanese South. DDS affirms, as an absolute rule applicable in all countries without exception, that its micro-groups never replace, erase, or dilute existing identities, languages, religions, customs, local traditions, or community and traditional structures. DDS also explicitly and permanently protects all legal political opposition forces, regardless of their affiliation, and all ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other minorities, without exception. Pluralism is not a tolerance granted by DDS: it is a structural condition of its functioning, integrated into the very architecture of the micro-groups, where each community, each village, each neighborhood retains its own micro-group, its own voice and its own right of veto over decisions that directly concern it.
The golden rule: wealth and decision-making power remain forever with the people
This principle underpins DDS's work in every country in the world, without exception, and it fully structures this program for Chad. The country's natural resources—oil, gold, uranium, natron, farmland, pastures, and the fisheries resources of Lake Chad—as well as the power to decide the nation's political, economic, and social future, must belong permanently and irrevocably to the Chadian people themselves, and to them alone. No trade agreement, no external debt, no personal or dynastic power, no foreign power can legitimately usurp what structurally and definitively belongs to the nation and its citizens. Part V of this document details the concrete mechanisms—people's sovereign wealth fund, extractive transparency contracts, caps on foreign participation, and citizen dividend—that transform this principle into an operational and verifiable reality for Chad.
“We are not proposing a distant utopia. We are proposing a method, verifiable step by step, country by country, micro-group by micro-group.”
Critical analysis of the current situation in Chad
This section presents a comprehensive, honest, and well-documented diagnosis of the actual situation in Chad in 2026, encompassing its political, economic, financial, and social dimensions. In accordance with the DDS methodology, this diagnosis neither seeks to exaggerate nor embellish the reality: it describes the facts, places them within their historical and structural context, and precisely identifies the mechanisms that currently prevent a lasting improvement in the living conditions of the Chadian population.
|
Indicator |
Current situation (2025-2026) |
|
Population |
Approximately 21.6 million inhabitants, median age of 15.7 years, very rapid population growth, low urbanization (22.7%) |
|
National poverty rate |
Between 42.3% and 44.8% of the population; projected to reach 45.4% in 2026-2027 according to the World Bank |
|
Extreme poverty (international threshold) |
36.5% in 2024, a continuous increase since 2018 (31.2%); approximately 9.5 million people projected to be living in extreme poverty in 2026-2027 |
|
Human Capital Index (World Bank) |
0.30 out of 1: A child born today will be approximately 70% less productive as an adult than with a complete education and health. |
|
Displaced persons and refugees |
Nearly 2 million people have been forcibly displaced, including more than 900,000 Sudanese refugees and approximately 390,000 Chadian returnees since April 2023. |
|
Humanitarian needs |
Between 4 and 4.5 million people will need humanitarian assistance in 2026 (more than a third of the population) |
|
Literacy |
Approximately 33 to 40% of the adult population, one of the lowest rates in sub-Saharan Africa |
|
Oil dependence |
Oil accounts for approximately 70% of exports and about 41% of government revenue |
|
External debt |
Approximately $3 billion, restructured in 2024 within the common framework of the G20, with a strong focus on a small number of creditors. |
|
Composition of the National Assembly (2024) |
188 seats, including 124 for the ruling party (MPS), the main opposition party which boycotted the election |
Political and institutional situation
Chad has been led since April 2021 by Marshal Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, who came to power at the head of a Transitional Military Council after the death of his father, President Idriss Déby Itno, killed by rebels after thirty years of unchallenged rule. This succession, presented by the government as having "prevented the country from descending into chaos," nevertheless enshrined, from the outset, a transfer of power through lineage and force of arms rather than through a pluralistic electoral process.
A new constitution was adopted by referendum in December 2023 and then revised in September-October 2025. This constitutional revision, passed by an overwhelming majority in Parliament, extended the presidential term to seven years, renewable indefinitely. The opposition denounced this reform as "authoritarian," arguing that it paves the way for the head of state to remain in power indefinitely. In May 2024, Mahamat Idriss Déby won the presidential election by a margin considered by his critics to be a sign of consolidation rather than democratic reform.
The first parliamentary elections since 2011 were held on December 29, 2024, combined for the first time with provincial and local elections. A significant portion of the opposition, including the Transformers party of former Prime Minister Succès Masra, called for a boycott, denouncing what they considered unfair conditions. The Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS), the president's party, won 124 out of 188 seats. Voter turnout was described as low by observers and contested by the opposition, which raised suspicions of fraud; the official turnout figures published by the electoral authority (ANGE) themselves varied considerably depending on the announcement, fueling distrust.
On April 1, 2026, a new 37-member government was appointed, combining the reappointment of key ministers (Foreign Affairs, Finance, Defense) with the integration of figures from the opposition and civil society, including a former vice-president of the Les Transformateurs party appointed Minister of Higher Education. While this reshuffle reflects an apparent desire for openness, many regional observers also see it as a classic strategy of co-opting the most influential opposition figures, aimed at consolidating central government control rather than genuinely expanding democratic space.
At the same time, the repression of organized opposition forces intensified. In late April 2026, nine leaders of the Political Actors Consultation Group (GCAP)—a coalition of thirteen political parties and representatives of civil society, the only platform to have systematically contested the elections and called for a boycott—were arrested on the eve of a protest march that had already been banned by the authorities. The Ministry of Public Security subsequently announced the outright dissolution of the GCAP by order of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, in January 2026, President Déby was referred to the International Criminal Court for alleged support of the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces rebels, an accusation that Chad denies but which illustrates the fragility of the country's international standing.
The media landscape reflects this same institutional fragility: the country's only television channel, Télé Tchad, owned by the state, in fact only covers the capital; the private press, already limited by illiteracy and the cost of distribution, operates without the legal subsidies it is owed, which has led some independent media to refuse to cover national elections.
Critical synthesis: a facade of pluralism and a growing concentration of power
Chad exhibits all the characteristics of a regime that specialists describe as "electoral authoritarianism" or a "sham democracy": elections are held, opposition parties exist, but the actual conditions for political competition—access to the media, neutrality of the electoral administration, freedom of assembly, and judicial independence—remain structurally unfavorable to any genuine change of power. The 2025 constitutional revision allowing for an indefinitely renewable presidential term, combined with the dissolution of the main united opposition coalition in 2026, demonstrates that the current system lacks the internal capacity to reform itself in the direction of genuine democratization. Any lasting solution must therefore involve a mechanism that does not depend on the goodwill of the ruling power to restore a real voice to citizens—this is precisely the subject of Part III of this document.
Economic and financial situation
The Chadian economy remains structurally dependent on oil production, which began in 2003 and now accounts for approximately 70% of the country's exports and about 41% of government revenue, contributing roughly 15% directly to GDP. This dependence has recently become even more precarious: the 2023 nationalization of ExxonMobil's assets, which prevented their sale to the British company Savannah Energy, has eroded the confidence of international investors. Savannah Energy is now suing the Chadian state for damages, with a judgment expected in the first half of 2026, and has consequently abandoned a 500-megawatt solar expansion project, sending a further negative signal to foreign investors in the energy sector.
Chad's external debt, amounting to approximately $3 billion, underwent an unprecedented restructuring within the joint framework of the G20 and the Paris Club, involving both official bilateral creditors and the commodities trader Glencore, which alone holds nearly a quarter of the country's total debt. This extreme concentration of Chadian debt on a single private actor, a legacy of the 2014 acquisition of oil assets from Chevron, illustrates a structural vulnerability: a significant portion of the country's fiscal sovereignty depends more on the decisions of a very small number of foreign creditors than on the choices of its own citizens.
The International Monetary Fund has been supporting Chad since July 2025 through a new $625 million Extended Credit Facility, running until July 2029, and S&P confirmed the country's sovereign rating at "B-" with a stable outlook in March 2026. For its part, the government presented its "Chad Connection 2030" plan in Abu Dhabi in November 2025, which envisions approximately $30 billion in cumulative public and private investments, with the stated objective of increasing GDP by 60%, lifting 2.5 million people out of poverty, and transforming the country into a regional logistics hub for the Sahel. More than $20.5 billion is reported to have been mobilized during the first phase. These announcements, however ambitious they may be, contrast with an actual level of public investment that has remained extremely low — barely 0.5% of GDP in 2024 — which raises questions about the real capacity to transform these commitments into tangible infrastructure and services for the population.
Economic growth remains volatile and largely insufficient to keep pace with population growth: real GDP grew by 3.2% in 2024 after 4.9% in 2023, with flooding and the oil slowdown explaining this decline. International institutions diverge significantly on their 2025-2026 forecasts—the African Development Bank anticipating growth almost twice that projected by the IMF—reflecting genuine uncertainty about the country's macroeconomic trajectory. US tariffs of 13% on Chadian exports, the aging of existing oil fields, and the weak recovery of foreign investment in the hydrocarbon sector constitute downside risks identified by all observers.
Structurally, the Chadian economy remains dominated by the informal sector: approximately 88% of jobs are in this sector, with subsistence agriculture and livestock farming alone employing nearly 70% of the working population while contributing just over 40% to GDP. The public banking sector remains fragile, characterized by chronic undercapitalization and high levels of non-performing loans, with the two main public banks currently undergoing restructuring. Inflation, driven by rising food prices and a 40% increase in fuel prices, reached 8.7% in 2024, directly impacting the purchasing power of the poorest households, for whom food represents the largest share of expenditure.
Critical synthesis: a rentier economy, vulnerable and weakly redistributive
The economic diagnosis of Chad reveals a classic rentier economy: a natural resource (oil) generates the bulk of export and budget revenues, but this revenue is primarily used to service the external debt and maintain the macroeconomic balances demanded by international creditors, before directly benefiting citizens in the form of infrastructure, public services, or redistribution. Public investment, at 0.5% of GDP, is disproportionate to the needs of a country where the majority of the population still relies on subsistence farming in increasingly unstable climatic conditions. No current mechanism guarantees that the oil and mineral wealth of Chad's subsoil will accrue directly, measurably, and permanently to the people who are its rightful owners. This is precisely what the economic and financial DDS program, detailed in Part V, aims to correct.
Social and humanitarian situation
Chad currently hosts the largest number of refugees per capita in Africa. Since the outbreak of the civil war in Sudan in April 2023, more than 900,000 Sudanese refugees and nearly 390,000 Chadian returnees have crossed the eastern border, bringing the total number of forcibly displaced persons in the country to almost two million, 87% of whom are women and children. This influx has tripled the population density in some eastern provinces, such as Ouaddaï and Sila, overwhelming already inadequate basic social services and fueling growing intercommunal tensions between displaced populations and host communities.
This humanitarian pressure is compounded by an already extreme structural vulnerability: between 4 and 4.5 million people—more than a third of the country's population—will need humanitarian assistance in 2026, according to the UN Humanitarian Response Plan, which mobilizes a budget of $986 million but still falls short of meeting all identified needs. Chronic underfunding of international aid has already led to the closure of several essential programs of the World Food Programme, the International Organization for Migration, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, particularly in the south of the country, where more than 120,000 Central African refugees are directly affected.
The nutritional situation is alarming: approximately two million Chadian children aged six to fifty-nine months are suffering or expected to suffer from acute malnutrition between October 2025 and September 2026, including nearly 484,000 cases of severe acute malnutrition, according to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC). The 2024 floods destroyed more than 432,000 hectares of crops—the equivalent of more than 600,000 football fields—directly affecting nearly two million people and triggering disease outbreaks, including a cholera outbreak declared in July 2025 that resulted in 2,807 recorded cases and 157 deaths.
The Lake Chad region, which gives the country its name, remains plagued by insecurity caused by Boko Haram and its affiliated groups, which have displaced more than 250,000 people. These groups regularly carry out kidnappings for ransom: in April 2026, six Chadian nationals were abducted in the lake region, with the kidnappers releasing videos showing the execution of a hostage and demanding a ransom of 500 million CFA francs. In the north of the country, trafficking networks and illegal coal mining are compounded by gender-based violence and child labor, phenomena that are documented but still insufficiently addressed by existing institutions. On April 25, 2026, on the border with war-torn Sudan, an intercommunal clash between sedentary farmers and nomadic herders left at least 42 dead, a brutal reminder that conflicts related to transhumance and access to natural resources remain a structural factor of instability that the central power, by nature remote and centralized, struggles to anticipate and defuse.
In terms of education, Chad has an adult literacy rate of between 33 and 40%, one of the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa. While the net primary school enrollment rate reaches approximately 68 to 79% according to various sources, secondary school enrollment falls to around 10.5%, and the country has only a very small number of higher education institutions, concentrated almost exclusively in N'Djamena. This educational weakness is compounded by a long-documented problem of child labor, particularly in rural areas and among displaced populations.
Finally, and this is an absolutely central characteristic for understanding Chad and for designing any reform adapted to its reality: the country is often referred to as the "Tower of Babel of the world," due to its more than two hundred ethnic groups and more than one hundred and twenty living languages, grouped into three major language families (Hamito-Semitic, Nilo-Saharan, and Niger-Congo), of which only eighteen have more than fifty thousand speakers. French and Arabic have been the two official languages recognized by the Constitution since 1996, but in practice, French remains the almost exclusive working language of the administration, which keeps a significant portion of the Arabic-speaking population, and even more so the speakers of the numerous national languages without official status, out of public affairs.
Critical summary: a multidimensional crisis that international aid and the central government cannot manage alone
The social situation in Chad illustrates a vicious cycle where climate shocks (floods, desertification, the shrinking of Lake Chad), regional crises (the war in Sudan, the Boko Haram insurgency), demographic pressure, and structural poverty feed off each other, without any rapid and legitimate local decision-making mechanism allowing the communities directly affected—whether they be refugee-hosting villages, contested transhumance zones, or uncontrolled urban sprawl—to truly influence the responses to their own emergencies. The almost total dependence on international humanitarian funding, itself underfunded and vulnerable to occasional withdrawals by donors, demonstrates the structural limitations of a system where solidarity, decision-making, and information remain concentrated far from the citizens themselves.
General summary: why the current system cannot, on its own, provide a lasting solution to these problems
The preceding analysis highlights four mutually reinforcing structural mechanisms that explain why, despite successive development plans, despite support from the IMF and the World Bank, and despite the considerable oil and mineral resources of Chad's subsoil, the majority of the population continues to sink deeper into poverty: firstly, a concentration of political power that makes any reform dependent on the goodwill of a small circle of decision-makers, without permanent and structured citizen counter-power; secondly, a rentier economy whose profits primarily serve debt servicing and the macro-financial balances demanded from the outside, before financing infrastructure and services directly useful to the population; thirdly, a chronic dependence on international humanitarian aid, itself structurally underfunded and therefore incapable of replacing a genuine national solidarity safety net rooted in communities; fourthly, an exceptional ethnolinguistic and religious diversity which, lacking an appropriate institutional framework, is experienced more as a source of fragmentation and conflict than as the asset it should be.
Faced with this situation, DDS proposes neither regime change by force—an option that DDS explicitly and categorically rejects in every country in the world—nor a simple electoral alternation, the obvious limitations of which are demonstrated by recent Chadian history. DDS proposes a third way, peaceful, progressive, and verifiable: the construction, from the ground up and independently of the central government's will, of a parallel structure of direct decision-making, radical transparency, and collective ownership of national resources, which restores to the Chadian people, in each of their ethnic, religious, linguistic, and regional components, the real power to decide their own future. This is the subject of Part III of this document.
The DirectDemocracyS system: principles and architecture applied to Chad
This section presents the operational architecture of the DDS system — micro-groups, three-code identification, ddsAI and allddsAI, specialist groups, NTCO and GUMI-SV — and explains, in a concrete way and adapted to the Chadian reality, how this architecture makes it possible to give real, immediate and protected power to the Chadian people, including in the context of a regime where political pluralism remains structurally limited and where the space for organized protest has recently been restricted by the dissolution of the GCAP.
Fractal microgroups: the basic unit of direct democracy
The micro-group is the fundamental unit of DDS. It brings together a small number of citizens—a neighborhood in N'Djamena, a village in Mayo-Kebbi, a fishing community on Lake Chad, a refugee camp in Ouaddaï, an association of transhumant herders—who decide together, through direct discussion and voting, on the issues that concern them. These micro-groups are organized according to a fractal architecture, meaning that the same structure is repeated at all scales: a first level of 5 people, which regroups into levels of 25, then 125, then 625, and so on up to the national level. Each level elects, from among its members and on a rotating basis, temporary coordinators whose mandate is time-limited and revocable, which structurally prevents the emergence of permanent leaders, presidents for life, or ruling dynasties—the very problem that Chad has faced since 1990.
In practical terms, for Chad, this model means that each community retains its autonomy in decision-making on matters that directly concern it (village water management, allocation of grazing land, organization of aid for refugees, neighborhood security), while also participating, through the higher levels of the fractal structure, in decisions that commit the province or the entire nation (oil budget allocation, debt negotiation, security policy in the Lake Chad Basin). No decision is imposed from N'Djamena without the lower levels having had the opportunity to examine, amend, or oppose it. A meritocratic points system recognizes the commitment, competence, and actual contribution of each member, without ever creating a rigid hierarchy or inheritable privileges.
Why a fractal structure protects the Chadian people better than a centralized coalition
The recent experience of Chad is instructive in this regard and must be clearly understood: the Political Actors Consultation Group (GCAP), which brought together thirteen parties and numerous representatives of civil society, was dissolved overnight by a Supreme Court decision, and its leaders arrested within hours, precisely because it was a centralized structure with identifiable leadership and a single headquarters. A fractal architecture of thousands of autonomous micro-groups, by its very nature, presents no single breaking point: there is no national leader of the DDS movement who can be arrested to silence the entire system, and the dissolution of one local micro-group has no effect on the thousands of other micro-groups scattered across the country.
The three-code identification system: participate without exposing yourself
DDS has developed, as an original innovation, a three-code identification system that reliably verifies that a participant is indeed a real human being, that they use only a single digital identity, and that they have the right to participate in the decisions of a given micro-group—without ever linking this verified identity to the person's real civil identity or their specific activity on the platform. For Chad, where freedom of political expression remains fragile and where arrests of opposition leaders occurred in 2026, this mechanism is of vital importance: a farmer in Logone, a teacher in N'Djamena, or a herder in Kanem can fully participate in the decisions of their DDS micro-group, express disagreement with a public policy, vote for or against a proposal, without fear of being identified, profiled, or harassed for this single participation. The verification guarantees the integrity of the vote (one person, one vote, no duplicates or external manipulation); Anonymity protects the person themselves.
ddsAI and allddsAI: complete, neutral and incorruptible information
ddsAI is DDS's neutral artificial intelligence tool, designed to inform every citizen and every micro-group in a comprehensive, accurate, and independent manner, free from any political, economic, or media influence. In Chad, where public television effectively only covers the capital and where the private press operates without the legal subsidies it is entitled to, ddsAI addresses an immediate and verifiable need: to provide access, in local languages as well as in French and Arabic, to verified information on public decisions, oil contracts, the use of restructured debt funds, the actual progress of the "Chad Connection 2030" plan, or the security situation in the Lake Chad Basin—without depending on the goodwill of a state media outlet or the always uncertain availability of a print newspaper in a remote rural area.
allddsAI goes further: it is the framework through which several specialized artificial intelligence instances participate, on equal footing with official members possessing defined rights and responsibilities, in the democratic input of micro-group decisions—without ever replacing the human vote, which always remains sovereign. An allddsAI instance can, for example, objectively analyze the foreseeable consequences of an oil dividend redistribution policy on local inflation, or compare several scenarios for managing the arrival of refugees in a given province, drawing on the expertise of groups of human specialists (agronomists, doctors, hydraulic engineers, economists, social cohesion specialists) who support each micro-group. This "AI democracy" ensures that technical expertise informs popular decision-making instead of replacing it, and that it remains, like all components of DDS, verifiable, transparent, and revocable.
NTCO and GUMI-SV: Operational Coordination and Global Economic Architecture of DDS
The NTCO (Territorial Operational Coordination Node) is the body that connects neighboring micro-groups on the ground for practical needs that extend beyond the scale of a single village or neighborhood: logistical organization of mutual aid between host communities and refugee populations, operational coordination in the face of a flood or a cholera epidemic, and networking of mobile specialist groups (health, agriculture, hydraulics) between several micro-groups within the same province. The NTCO is never a new center of power: its coordinators are appointed on a rotating basis from among the micro-groups it serves, report directly to them, and its role is strictly limited to operational coordination, never to political decision-making, which always remains the exclusive prerogative of the micro-groups themselves.
GUMI-SV is DDS's unified global investment management and solidarity mechanism, which enables the transparent and verifiable channeling of savings, contributions, and investments from micro-groups—both Chadian and international—towards real local development projects (boreholes, solar panels, community silos, schools, mobile clinics), while guaranteeing that ownership of this infrastructure remains collective and non-transferable; that is, it can never be bought back, seized, or transferred to an external private company, foreign creditor, or political leader. Its complete technical architecture is detailed in DDS's dedicated global documents; this program applies its principles directly to the needs identified for Chad in Part V.
How DDS gives power to the people without free elections, without confrontation, and without violence
Chad perfectly illustrates the case for which this section was designed: a country where elections formally exist, but where the actual competition remains structurally flawed, where the main unified opposition coalition has been dissolved by the courts, and where a recent constitutional revision allows for an indefinite hold on power. In this context, DDS neither expects nor demands electoral reform as a prerequisite for its actions. DDS is building, starting today and independently of any authorization from the central government, a parallel architecture of direct decision-making that is gradually becoming the concrete reality of popular power, regardless of the official electoral calendar.
An architecture that asks no one's permission
The DDS micro-groups never present themselves, at their inception, as opposition political organizations. They establish themselves as structures for mutual aid, agricultural coordination, collective savings, water management, or community organization—exactly the type of associative or cooperative initiative already recognized and encouraged by Chadian law, and already practiced, in other forms, by community development projects financed by the World Bank or the French Development Agency. This practical and concrete nature protects the micro-groups: in practice, there is no legal reason to prohibit them, since they provide an immediate and verifiable service to their members, even before exercising their function of direct democracy.
Protection through anonymity and decentralization
As explained above, the three-code identification system protects each individual participant, while the fractal architecture, without an identifiable national leader, protects the system as a whole. Unlike a coalition of parties like the GCAP, whose administrative dissolution was enough to officially neutralize the entire organization, a network of thousands of local micro-groups cannot be eliminated by a single court decision, decree, or wave of arrests. It is this structural resilience, not a confrontational stance, that constitutes the true security guarantee of the DDS system in Chad.
A non-confrontational path, open to dialogue with the powers that be.
DDS does not seek to overthrow anyone, does not ally itself with any armed group, does not participate in any violent action, and does not support any insurgency, whether historical rebel movements or groups like Boko Haram, which DDS unequivocally condemns. On the contrary, DDS explicitly proposes that the current Chadian government, as well as all local and provincial authorities, recognize DDS micro-groups as operational partners in the implementation of the "Chad Connection 2030" plan and community development programs already supported by international donors. A micro-group that organizes the distribution of drinking water, coordinates the reception of Sudanese refugees with local communities, or facilitates dialogue between farmers and transhumant herders is, in effect, providing a service that the central government, due to its geographical and institutional distance, cannot always provide itself. This concrete and immediate utility creates the conditions for peaceful coexistence, then for progressive recognition, without any frontal confrontation ever being necessary or sought.
The long timeframe of peaceful change
DDS's objective is not to provoke a sudden regime change, but to build, micro-group by micro-group, a reality where decision-making power and ownership of wealth concretely and verifiably belong to the Chadian people, until this reality becomes more advantageous for the current regime itself to officially recognize than to resist. This is precisely the method already applied by DDS in other countries facing comparable political constraints, and its implementation schedule for Chad is detailed in Part VII of this document.
Absolute respect for traditions, cultures, languages, religions, opposing viewpoints, and minorities.
No reform proposed by DDS in Chad replaces, dilutes, or subordinates existing traditional structures—traditional chieftaincies, councils of elders, local religious authorities, and customary land and water management organizations. The DDS micro-group complements these structures and works with them, never against them or in their place. Each micro-group operates in the language(s) chosen by its members from among the more than 120 living languages of Chad, with support from ddsAI for translation and interpretation. This explicitly includes Chadian Arabic, Sara, Ngambay, Kanembu, Toubou, Zaghawa, Moundang, and all other national languages, whether officially recognized or not.
On the religious front, DDS remains strictly neutral among all faiths and explicitly guarantees freedom of worship and practice for Muslim, Christian, and traditional African religious communities present in Chad, without any religious doctrine being imposed or excluded from micro-groups. On the political front, everyone, regardless of their party affiliation—member or supporter of the ruling MPS, Les Transformateurs, RNDT-Le Réveil, a dissolved GCAP party, or any other legal political movement—is welcomed with equal rights and voting rights within the DDS micro-groups in their neighborhood or village. DDS explicitly and specifically protects all ethnic minorities in Chad, whether they number several million members like the Sara or the Chadian Arabs, or only a few thousand speakers like some languages of the South or East, as well as refugee and displaced populations, who benefit from the same rights of participation as the host communities in the micro-groups formed in the areas where they reside.
"One vote per person, never one less vote for a minority, never one more vote for a power."
Political program for Chad
This section translates the general architecture of DDS, presented in Part III, into a concrete political program for Chad: where to establish the first micro-groups, how to protect all political sensitivities and minorities, how to peacefully defuse the intercommunal conflicts that cost human lives in 2026, and how to build, step by step, a relationship of coexistence and then recognition with existing institutions, without ever resorting to confrontation or violence.
Specific diagnosis and policy objectives
The diagnosis presented in Part II calls for three specific political objectives for Chad: first, to give every Chadian citizen, regardless of the official electoral calendar and the parliamentary configuration resulting from the December 2024 election, a real, permanent and protected channel for decision-making on matters that directly concern them; second, to transform the country's exceptional ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity, which today is too often a source of fragmentation, into an architecture of direct representation where each community retains its own voice; third, to sustainably defuse the most active hotspots of tension — the border with war-torn Sudan, the Lake Chad basin under pressure from Boko Haram, the disputed transhumance corridors between farmers and herders — through the direct mediation of the communities concerned rather than through the sole, ever slower and more distant intervention of the central administration.
Gradual establishment of DDS micro-groups across Chadian territory
The implementation of DDS micro-groups in Chad follows a fractal and geographically representative logic, beginning with a limited number of pilot areas chosen for their diversity and the urgency of the needs they express, before a gradual expansion to all twenty-three provinces of the country. Four pilot areas illustrate the method: a group of neighborhoods in N'Djamena, representative of the urban diversity and youth of the country (median age of 15.7 years); a rural area in the South, in Sara country, centered around subsistence and cotton farming; the Lake Province, directly affected by insecurity linked to Boko Haram and by the shrinking of Lake Chad; and the Ouaddaï region, in the East, where the population density has tripled due to the arrival of Sudanese refugees.
In each of these areas, the initial micro-group of five people is formed from volunteers representing, as far as possible, the actual local diversity (gender, generation, ethnic origin, resident or displaced status), and then develops through transparent co-optation to levels of 25, 125, and 625 members. Each level remains linked to the lower levels through the principle of continuous reporting and the revocability of temporary coordinators. ddsAI supports this process in the languages chosen by each community, ensuring that a lack of proficiency in French—which currently excludes a significant portion of the population from public affairs—is no longer a barrier to participation.
Protection and explicit inclusion of all political sensitivities
The DDS micro-groups in Chad welcome, with equal rights and without discrimination, supporters of the ruling Patriotic Salvation Movement, activists of the Transformers, members of the National Rally of Chadian Democrats-The Awakening, as well as former leaders and supporters of the thirteen parties that comprised the Political Actors Consultation Group before its administrative dissolution. This inclusion is not a stance of weak neutrality: it is a structural guarantee, integrated into the very architecture of the micro-group, where no partisan affiliation can be invoked to exclude a participant or to influence their vote. DDS thus offers, in effect, a space for direct political participation to tens of thousands of Chadians whose main platform for collective expression was dissolved in 2026, without this space being legally or politically considered an opposition structure to the government, since it remains open, under the same conditions, to members of the ruling party.
Peaceful management of intercommunal conflicts and regional diversity
The clash of April 25, 2026, between settled farmers and nomadic Arab herders on the border with Sudan, which claimed the lives of at least forty-two people, illustrates a type of recurring conflict that the remoteness of the central administration makes it difficult to prevent effectively. The DDS program proposes, for each transhumance zone identified as at risk, the creation of a joint, equal-representation micro-group comprising representatives from farming and herding communities, supported by a group of specialists in land mediation and pastoral management, and by ddsAI to map in real time the availability of water and pasture along traditional transhumance corridors. This micro-group has a shared veto right over any decision concerning the seasonal opening or closing of the corridors, thus transforming a potentially violent power struggle into a permanent and documented negotiation mechanism.
In regions hosting a high number of Sudanese refugees, such as Ouaddaï, Wadi Fira, Sila and East Ennedi, the same principle applies to the relationship between host and displaced populations: a joint micro-group, where each camp and each neighbouring village has equal representation, collectively decides on the distribution of water points, access to available arable land and the prioritization of the most urgent needs, thus reducing the risk of intercommunal tensions that humanitarian agencies themselves identify as growing in the face of the saturation of basic services.
Gradual and secure institutional reform
At this stage, DDS is not proposing any changes to the Chadian Constitution or the official electoral calendar. Its political program for Chad consists of building, micro-group by micro-group, a real and documented practice of direct decision-making on concrete issues—water management, local security, aid distribution, land mediation—and then proposing official recognition to provincial and national authorities, once this practice has proven its usefulness, in the form of consultative status or a partnership charter, comparable to existing participatory community development mechanisms supported by the World Bank and the French Development Agency. This gradual approach avoids any premature institutional confrontation while building, from this day forward, the foundations of a sustainable direct democracy. The Chadian diaspora, organized and represented even in current government structures, is explicitly associated with this process: micro-groups of the diaspora, in France, in the Gulf countries or elsewhere in Africa, can now participate in the reflection and solidarity investment described in Part V, without waiting for the generalization of the system on the national territory.
Concrete examples and anticipated consequences
|
Concrete example of a DDS microgroup |
Applied Mechanism |
Expected consequence |
|
Joint micro-group of refugees and host population in a camp in Ouaddaï |
Equal representation, direct voting on water and land allocation, multilingual support for DDSAI |
Measurable reduction in intercommunity tensions related to the saturation of basic services |
|
Mixed micro-group of farmers and livestock breeders on a border transhumance corridor |
Shared veto power, real-time mapping of water and grazing resources, specialized mediation |
Prevention of deadly clashes like the one on April 25, 2026 (42 dead) |
|
Local transparency micro-group on the "Chad Connection 2030" project |
Direct citizen monitoring of disbursements and works, verification via ddsAI and continuous publication |
Reduction of local diversions and improvement in the actual delivery of promised infrastructure |
|
A small neighborhood group in N'Djamena bringing together supporters of the MPS, the Transformers, and those without affiliation. |
Equal participation, no partisan exclusion, secret ballot protected by the three codes |
Gradual rebuilding of political trust and the practice of peaceful debate between rival political groups |
"Power is not seized by force, nor is it attained through patience alone: it is built, community by community, through the daily practice of direct decision-making."
Economic and financial program for Chad
The diagnosis in Part II revealed a Chadian economy dependent on oil revenues, the benefits of which are primarily used to service the debt and maintain the macro-financial balances demanded by a limited number of external creditors, before directly benefiting the population. DDS's economic and financial program for Chad transforms this situation by applying, in an operational and verifiable manner, the golden rule outlined in Part I: the wealth of Chad's subsoil and natural resources must return, permanently and in a measurable way, to the people who are their rightful owners.
Guiding principle: the wealth of Chad's subsoil belongs, forever, to the Chadian people.
DDS proposes the creation of a Chadian People's Sovereign Fund, managed according to the GUMI-SV architecture, into which a fixed and non-negotiable share of the country's oil, gold, and mining revenues is automatically paid before any allocation to the state budget or debt servicing. This fund belongs collectively and non-transferably to all Chadian citizens, each holding an equal share, in accordance with DDS's principle of collective ownership. Part of its income finances a direct citizen dividend, paid to each adult member verified by the three-code system, primarily in the poorest provinces and refugee-hosting areas where resource pressure is greatest; another part finances infrastructure projects decided directly by local micro-groups (boreholes, schools, health posts, silos), according to the procedures described later in this section.
This mechanism draws inspiration from the experience of other oil-producing countries that have established citizen sovereign wealth funds, but adapts it to the Chadian context: unlike a fund managed by a single state agency, the Chadian People's Sovereign Wealth Fund is continuously audited by specialized public finance micro-groups, supported by ddsAI, which publish ongoing reports in local languages on revenues collected, disbursements made, and investments undertaken. This radical transparency is the concrete condition that transforms an abstract principle of popular sovereignty over resources into a verifiable reality, figure by figure, by any citizen.
Regarding future oil, gold or uranium mining contracts, DDS proposes that any new agreement with a foreign operator be published in full before ratification, reviewed by a group of independent specialists in mining law and extractive taxation, and submitted to the advisory opinion of micro-groups from the provinces directly concerned by the deposit. DDS also proposes a principle of minimal and non-dilutable citizen co-participation in any new contract for the exploitation of strategic resources, in order to avoid in the future the situation of legal uncertainty illustrated by the episode of the nationalization of ExxonMobil's assets in 2023 and the resulting litigation with Savannah Energy: rather than the binary alternative between state nationalization and transfer to a foreign operator, a share of each strategic extractive asset belongs directly, via the People's Sovereign Fund, to Chadian citizens, which secures both the investor, who has a stable partner not subject to political uncertainties, and the people, whose share of ownership cannot be sold or seized without their direct consent.
Transparent and citizen-led management of public debt
Chad's external debt, restructured in 2024 within the G20 framework with nearly a quarter of it held by the single trader Glencore, must be monitored by a specialized national sovereign debt micro-group. This micro-group, composed of volunteer citizens supported by public finance specialists and ddsAI, publishes quarterly the actual debt service-to-revenue ratio, upcoming maturities, and the terms of any new borrowing. DDS proposes that any new public borrowing exceeding a significant threshold be subject to prior consultation, even if initially non-binding, with the national micro-groups. This consultation would ensure that the Chadian population has a clear and proactive understanding of what will commit the country's future revenues, sometimes for decades.
Economic diversification: agriculture, livestock farming and fishing at the heart of the program
With nearly 70% of the working population employed in subsistence agriculture and livestock farming, contributing just over 40% to GDP, Chad's immediate economic priority is not rapid industrialization, but rather increasing the productivity and resilience of these food-producing sectors. DDS micro-farming groups, supported by specialists in Sahelian agronomy and by ddsAI for climate and soil data analysis, are coordinating the establishment of community silos resistant to flooding, such as that of 2024, which destroyed over 432,000 hectares of crops, as well as small-scale irrigation systems and shared seed banks, primarily funded by the People's Sovereign Fund in provinces where acute malnutrition currently affects up to two million children.
In the cotton sector, where the inauguration of a new ginning plant in 2025 has already strengthened local processing capacity, micro-groups of producers collectively negotiate, through groups of agricultural trade specialists, better purchasing conditions with industrial operators, increasing the share of added value that remains in the hands of the producers themselves rather than solely with intermediaries. The same principle applies to gum arabic, sesame, and transhumant livestock farming, the country's second-largest export sector, for which the pastoral micro-groups described in Part IV combine peaceful management of transhumance corridors with collective negotiation of livestock selling prices in regional markets.
Regarding Lake Chad itself, whose fish stocks have been gradually recovering since the decline in global fuel prices, fishing communities are forming micro-groups for the sustainable management of fisheries resources, in coordination with existing authorities, in order to avoid overexploitation while securing the income of families who have depended on this activity for generations.
Gradual formalization and protection of the informal sector
With 88% of jobs operating in the informal economy, any Chadian economic policy that ignores this reality, or seeks to eliminate it abruptly through taxation, would condemn the vast majority of Chadian families to failure and impoverishment. DDS proposes the opposite: a gradual and incentive-based formalization process, organized by local micro-economic groups, which offer their members access to collective micro-savings and solidarity microcredit through the GUMI-SV framework, in exchange for voluntary registration in a simplified register maintained by the micro-group itself. This registration grants access to beneficial and tangible services—collective crop insurance, credit for purchasing agricultural inputs, and mutual guarantees for small traders—without initially imposing any new tax burden. This reverses the current logic where formalization, for the time being, only brings obligations without any immediate, perceptible benefits.
Infrastructure and opening up isolated areas: transforming international investments into verifiable benefits for citizens
Chad is a landlocked country, and several infrastructure projects financed by international partners are already underway: the connectivity and integration project financed to the tune of $170 million by the World Bank to open up the Lake region, the "Almé Djah" drinking water access project of approximately $100 million, the memorandum of understanding signed in January 2026 with the SUEZ group for technical support of the water sector, and the support of €15 million from the French Development Agency for structuring projects. DDS proposes that each of these projects be accompanied, from its design phase, by a local citizen micro-monitoring group, which examines the plans, verifies the actual progress of the work on the ground and publishes its findings via ddsAI, so that the inhabitants of the areas concerned — and not only international donors and the central administration — can verify, step by step, that the roads, markets, solar warehouses and boreholes announced are actually built, usable and maintained.
This citizen monitoring method applies in the same way to the entire "Chad Connection 2030" plan, whose announced $30 billion investment will only produce a real improvement in living conditions if its concrete execution, on each site and in each province, is verifiable by the populations directly concerned, and no longer just announced in international donor conferences like the one in Abu Dhabi in November 2025.
Financial inclusion and banking stability in service of citizens
Faced with the fragility of Chad's public banking sector—chronic undercapitalization, high non-performing loans, and the ongoing restructuring of the two main public banks—DDS proposes that any new injection of public capital into these banks be accompanied by the creation of a citizen audit committee. This committee, composed of members of specialized micro-groups in finance, would have access to the same information as international auditors. This would ensure that the recapitalization of these institutions does not result, as too often happens elsewhere, in the socialization of losses without any corresponding transparency for the citizens who indirectly bear the cost. Simultaneously, GUMI-SV connects the savings of the Chadian diaspora, already organized and institutionally represented, to direct and documented investments in local micro-economic groups, creating a financing channel that complements traditional banks, particularly for small producers and traders excluded from conventional bank credit.
A fairer tax system, based on verifiable trust
Expanding the non-oil tax base, necessary to reduce budgetary dependence on hydrocarbons, cannot succeed without the trust of a population that currently sees too rarely where public money is going. DDS proposes that all new non-oil tax revenue be subject to public budgetary monitoring, accessible via ddsAI, showing in real time the allocation of each revenue category to the corresponding expenditures—education, health, infrastructure, security—at the national level and, as far as possible, at the provincial level. This radical transparency, combined with progressive taxation and tax relief for very small informal operators currently undergoing formalization through incentives, constitutes the basic condition for the tax compliance that is currently largely lacking.
Concrete examples and anticipated consequences
|
Economic measure DDS |
Concrete mechanism |
Expected consequence for Chad |
|
Chadian People's Sovereign Fund (GUMI-SV) |
Fixed share of oil and gold revenues paid automatically, direct citizen dividend verified by the three codes |
Direct and measurable redistribution of extractive rents to citizens, reduction of extreme poverty which affects 36.5% of the population |
|
Non-dilutable citizen co-participation in new extractive contracts |
Share of popular ownership included from the outset of negotiations; full publication of contracts before ratification |
Increased legal security for investors and a guarantee that the resource remains, in part, the direct property of the people |
|
Citizen micro-groups monitoring major infrastructure projects |
On-site verification by the residents concerned, ongoing publication via ddsAI |
Reducing the gap between announced infrastructure and infrastructure actually delivered and maintained |
|
Incentivizing formalization of the informal sector |
Solidarity microcredit and micro-savings in exchange for voluntary registration, without any immediate new tax burden |
Gradual expansion of access to credit for 88% of workers currently excluded from the formal system |
Social program for Chad
Part II established that the social crisis in Chad is multidimensional: mass poverty, malnutrition affecting millions of children, the most acute refugee crisis in Africa per capita, recurring epidemics, insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin, and weak education and health systems. DDS's social program for Chad addresses each of these fronts using the same instrument: competent community micro-groups, continuously informed by ddsAI and specialist groups, and partly funded by the People's Sovereign Fund described in Part V.
Education: Moving beyond one of Africa's lowest literacy rates
With an adult literacy rate between 33 and 40% and secondary school enrollment limited to approximately 10.5%, education is the most crucial lever for the future of Chad, whose population has a median age of 15.7 years. DDS proposes that each local micro-group in a village or neighborhood become the anchor point for an adult literacy program, conducted in the local language chosen by the community itself, with support from ddsAI for the production of adapted teaching materials and from groups of specialists in multilingual pedagogy. For children, micro-groups coordinate complementary community classes, particularly in rural areas and refugee camps where secondary schooling remains virtually non-existent, with an explicit objective: that mastery of French or official Arabic is no longer, as is the case today, a condition for access to public information and citizen participation, since ddsAI provides this function in the language chosen by each user.
In concrete terms, in a province like Ouaddaï where the school population has multiplied by the arrival of Sudanese refugee children, local micro-groups, with the support of emergency education specialists, organize classes with adapted numbers bringing together displaced children and children from host communities in the same structures, avoiding the formation of parallel and competing educational systems that fuel the intercommunal tensions already identified in Part IV.
Health and nutrition: responding to an emergency affecting two million children
With a human capital index of only 0.30 and nearly two million Chadian children suffering from or at risk of acute malnutrition between October 2025 and September 2026, including 484,000 severe cases, health is an absolute emergency. DDS micro-groups are responding to this emergency by coordinating mobile clinics, nutritional screening points, and emergency stocks of therapeutic products at the local level. These initiatives are organized in conjunction with, rather than in competition with, existing health structures. The groups of public health and nutrition specialists, supported by ddsAI for real-time mapping of areas most vulnerable to malnutrition and disease outbreaks, enable a faster response than centralized administrative channels. This approach is similar to how it facilitated an earlier response to the cholera outbreak of July 2025, which resulted in 2,807 cases and 157 deaths.
In remote rural areas, where access to a health center can involve several hours of walking, local micro-groups also organize community health relay networks, trained by mobile specialists and equipped with ddsAI tools that operate offline, capable of identifying early signs of severe malnutrition or epidemic disease and triggering an alert to higher levels of the fractal structure before the situation becomes critical.
Refugees, displaced persons and social cohesion: transforming a crisis into shared management
Chad hosts more refugees per capita than any other African country, with over 900,000 Sudanese refugees and nearly 390,000 Chadian returnees since April 2023. Faced with chronic underfunding of international aid, which has already led to the closure of essential programs of the World Food Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), DDS proposes that local micro-groups in host areas become points of direct coordination between locally available resources (arable land, water points, school and health infrastructure) and needs documented in real time by ddsAI. This would ensure that solidarity between host communities and displaced populations no longer depends solely on unpredictable external humanitarian funding. This approach applies equally to the more than 120,000 Central African refugees in the south of the country, who are too often overlooked in humanitarian priorities focused on the Sudanese border.
Women, children and the fight against violence
Women and children represent 87% of the displaced and refugee population in Chad and remain the primary victims of gender-based violence, child labor, and documented trafficking networks in the north of the country. DDS proposes that each micro-group, from its inception, include guaranteed women's representation in its decision-making bodies, and that a team of specialists in child protection and combating gender-based violence support the micro-groups in the most vulnerable areas, with a reporting channel protected by the three-code system, which guarantees the anonymity of victims and witnesses while enabling a rapid and coordinated response.
Security, peace and the fight against extremism in the Lake Chad Basin
In the face of the atrocities committed by Boko Haram and its affiliated groups, which have displaced more than 250,000 people and regularly carry out kidnappings for ransom in the Lake Chad region, DDS unequivocally reiterates that it never deals with armed or terrorist groups and does not legitimize any form of violence. The role of local micro-groups in this region is to strengthen community resilience to this insecurity: early warning systems shared between neighboring villages via ddsAI, coordination of unarmed civilian self-defense and organized evacuations in the event of an identified threat, and rapid transmission of verified information to the legitimate state security forces, whose actions remain the only legitimate authority for the use of force. This community coordination reinforces, rather than replaces, the state's security efforts in a region where geographical remoteness currently limits its capacity for rapid response.
Climate and environment: protecting Lake Chad and agricultural land
The historic shrinking of Lake Chad, the 2024 floods that destroyed over 432,000 hectares of crops, and the increasing pressure of Sahelian desertification pose direct threats to the livelihoods of the majority of the population. DDS proposes that micro-groups in the most exposed areas coordinate, with the support of specialists in hydrology and Sahelian agroecology, the implementation of community dikes, retention basins, and agricultural practices adapted to increasing climate variability, funded in part by the People's Sovereign Fund described in Part V, which dedicates a portion of its resources to climate resilience in the most vulnerable provinces.
Concrete examples and anticipated consequences
|
social domain |
Concrete action of the DDS micro-groups |
Expected consequence |
|
Adult literacy |
Local language programs supported by ddsAI, in each micro-group of village or neighborhood |
Increase in the literacy rate beyond the current 33-40%, direct access to public information |
|
Infant nutrition |
Community screening relays and locally coordinated mobile clinics |
Earlier detection and management of cases of severe acute malnutrition (484,000 current cases) |
|
Refugee-host community cohesion |
Joint micro-groups for the distribution of local resources (water, land, schools) |
Reduction of intercommunal tensions in areas where population density has tripled |
|
Protection of women and children |
Guaranteed representation in micro-groups, anonymous and protected reporting channel |
Faster response to gender-based violence and child labour |
|
Climate resilience |
Community dikes and seed banks financed by the People's Sovereign Fund |
Reducing the impact of future floods on crops and food security |
Implementation: Phased roadmap for Chad
In accordance with the DDS methodology, this program is not a statement of intent but an implementation plan. This section presents the indicative schedule for the deployment of the DDS system in Chad, designed to be realistic given the country's constraints—vast distances, limited access to electricity and connectivity in many provinces, low literacy rates, and a restrictive political context—while ensuring continuous and verifiable progress.
Phase 1 — Information, awareness-raising and initial pilot micro-groups (months 1 to 6)
The first phase consists of disseminating clear information, in local languages and through channels independent of state media, about how DDS works, its safeguards for participant protection, and its immediate practical applications. Pilot micro-groups of five to twenty-five people are being formed in the four priority areas identified in Part IV: neighborhoods of N'Djamena, the rural Sara area of the South, the Lac province, and the Ouaddaï region. ddsAI is being deployed primarily in French, Chadian Arabic, and the majority languages of the pilot areas (Ngambay, Kanembu), with an interface adapted to intermittent connections and basic mobile phones, which are predominantly used in rural areas.
Phase 2 — Local consolidation and first concrete services (months 6 to 18)
The pilot micro-groups are consolidating their internal operations and demonstrating their usefulness through concrete and verifiable results: initial literacy programs, the first successful mediation along a transhumance corridor, and the first citizen monitoring of an infrastructure project funded by international donors. The three-code identification system is being rolled out to all participants. The first specialist groups (agronomy, health, land mediation, and public finance) are being formed and are working with the pilot micro-groups. The Chadian People's Sovereign Fund, based on the GUMI-SV architecture, is opening its first citizen accounts, initially funded by voluntary contributions from the micro-groups and the diaspora.
Phase 3 — Provincial-scale fractal expansion (months 18 to 36)
Based on the verified results from the pilot areas, the system is expanding, following the same fractal logic, to all twenty-three provinces of the country, leveraging the already trained members of the pilot micro-groups to support the creation of new cells. NTCO is becoming fully operational to coordinate logistical needs between neighboring micro-groups, particularly in refugee-hosting areas and areas affected by insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin. An initial proposal for official recognition, in the form of consultative status or a partnership charter, is being submitted to provincial and national authorities based on the results already achieved, without seeking any institutional confrontation.
Phase 4 — National consolidation and negotiation of institutional recognition (beyond 36 months)
At this stage, the DDS micro-group network covers the entire Chadian territory and represents a massive, documented, and undeniable practice of direct decision-making, transparent management of local resources, and peaceful mediation of intercommunal conflicts. This reality creates the conditions for negotiating, with the Chadian authorities of the time, a broader institutional recognition of the system—without any specific deadline being imposed from the outside, since the pace of this recognition depends on the country's own political evolution and not on a timetable unilaterally set by DDS.
|
Phase |
Approximate duration |
Main objective |
Success indicator |
|
Phase 1 |
Months 1 to 6 |
Information and pilot micro-groups |
4 active pilot zones, ddsAI available in 3 local languages |
|
Phase 2 |
Months 6 to 18 |
Concrete services and initial results |
First verified literacy and land mediation programs |
|
Phase 3 |
Months 18 to 36 |
Expansion to all 23 provinces |
Active DDS presence in the majority of Chadian provinces |
|
Phase 4 |
Beyond 36 months |
Negotiated institutional recognition |
Consultative status or partnership charter obtained with the authorities |
"No step in this timetable depends on external authorization: each phase is based on what the Chadians themselves build and demonstrate."
Protection against manipulation and security of DDS platforms
A direct democracy is only valuable if the information on which it is based is reliable, complete, and protected from manipulation. This section details how DDS protects its users and Chadian micro-groups against disinformation, media manipulation, and attempts at interference, whether they originate from inside or outside the country.
The Chadian context: a terrain particularly exposed to disinformation
Chad faces several specific vulnerabilities to disinformation: a public television network that effectively only covers the capital, a fragile and poorly distributed private press, a low literacy rate that limits access to written materials, and an ongoing civil war in neighboring Sudan that fuels numerous rumors and unverified information circulating on social media and through informal channels along the country's eastern border. This situation creates fertile ground for manipulation, whether it aims to exacerbate intercommunal tensions between farmers and herders, to incite mistrust between host communities and refugees, or to steer the national political debate in favor of one side or the other.
ddsAI as a bulwark against disinformation
ddsAI provides each user and each Chadian micro-group with verified, cross-checked, and neutral information, independent of any single source of power—be it the state, a political party, a foreign media outlet, or an unverified social network. Before sensitive information is disseminated within a micro-group (for example, a rumor of an incident on the Sudanese border or an accusation targeting a particular community), ddsAI applies a cross-checking process based on multiple documented sources, explicitly flags unconfirmed information as such, and, when facts are disputed, presents all documented versions rather than a single version presented as certain.
This neutrality is applied with the same rigor towards the ruling power as towards any opposition force: ddsAI never minimizes the actions of the Chadian government when the facts are established, but neither does it relay, without verification, accusations made by either side. It is this systematic neutrality, and not partisan sympathy, that constitutes the guarantee of trust in the system.
Technical security of DDS platforms
The three-code identification system, already described in Part III, prevents the creation of multiple fake accounts designed to artificially manipulate a microgroup vote (a practice known as a multiple identity attack), while also protecting the true anonymity of participants against the risks of political repression identified in Part II. Exchanges within microgroups are protected by end-to-end encryption, ensuring that no third party—including DDS itself—can access the content of a microgroup's internal deliberations without the explicit authorization of its members. Decisions made by vote are recorded in an unalterable manner, allowing, in the event of a dispute, objective verification that an announced result corresponds to the votes actually cast—a guarantee that directly addresses the allegations of electoral fraud documented in Part II concerning the Chadian elections of December 2024.
Protection against external interference and organized manipulation campaigns
Given Chad's sensitive geopolitical position—as a direct neighbor of war-torn Sudan and a partner of France, Algeria, Nigeria, and other regional and international powers with sometimes divergent interests—DDS platforms incorporate specific mechanisms for detecting coordinated manipulation campaigns. These campaigns originate from foreign actors seeking to steer the Chadian debate in a direction favorable to their interests, or from local actors seeking to exploit intercommunal tensions for political ends. These mechanisms, operated by groups of information security specialists in coordination with allddsAI, are never intended to censor legitimate opinions, but solely to identify and flag artificially coordinated dissemination patterns, characteristic of organized manipulation rather than the spontaneous expression of citizen opinion.
"Providing complete, accurate, and neutral information is not a technical luxury: it is the condition without which no direct democracy can function."
Conclusion
In 2026, Chad faces a situation that this document has neither sought to minimize nor to dramatize: a concentrated political power structure that is difficult to reform from within, an oil-based economy whose benefits do not sufficiently reach the population, and a social and humanitarian crisis of considerable magnitude, exacerbated by the war in neighboring Sudan, insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin, and repeated climate shocks. Faced with this reality, neither passively waiting for top-down reform nor violent confrontation constitutes a serious or responsible response.
DirectDemocracyS proposes a third way, already detailed point by point in this document: fractal community micro-groups, protected by a three-code identification system, informed by neutral and comprehensive information via ddsAI and allddsAI, supported by groups of competent specialists, and financed by a People's Sovereign Wealth Fund that finally guarantees that Chad's oil, gold, and agricultural wealth will sustainably return to its people. This path requires no permission from any authority, threatens no one, fully respects the country's exceptional ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity, protects all political sensitivities without exception, and is being built, starting today, independently of the official electoral calendar.
This program is not set in stone: like the entire DDS method, it will be adjusted as the Chadian micro-groups themselves gain practical experience with its implementation, while fully respecting their autonomy in decision-making. What DDS guarantees, however, is that this process remains, at every stage, peaceful, transparent, and faithful to the founding principle that applies in every country of the world without exception: the wealth of each nation and the power to decide its own destiny must remain, forever, in the hands of its people.
"Chad already possesses, in its very diversity, all the human resources necessary for its own direct democracy: DDS simply provides a method to connect them."