DirectDemocracy (DDS) is a global political, economic, and social system built on the foundations of direct democracy, shared leadership, inalienable collective ownership, and the continuous, informed participation of all citizens in every decision affecting their lives. DDS is not a political party in the traditional sense, not a violent subversive movement, and does not impose a single model from the outside. DDS is a tool, a methodology, and a socio-technological infrastructure that citizens of each nation can freely adopt and adapt to their own culture, history, language, and traditions to reclaim and directly exercise the political and economic power that rightfully belongs to them.

This document is specifically prepared for Vietnam, based on factual and up-to-date research on the country's political, economic, and social situation as of early 2026. It honestly and frankly analyzes the structural problems of the current system and proposes a concrete, feasible, peaceful, and respectful alternative program that fully respects Vietnamese national identity.

The fundamental principles of DDS

Logic, common sense, factual research, and facts are the foundation of any proposal — no dogma, no empty slogans.
Non-transferable collective ownership (NTCO): Vietnam's natural resources, strategic land, essential infrastructure, and public assets forever belong to the Vietnamese people — no government, political party, corporation, or foreign power has the right to sell, transfer, or mortgage them.
Fractal micro-group model (1→5→25→125→625…): bottom-up social organization, allowing millions of people to participate directly in decision-making without the need for cumbersome party-state structures.
The triple-code anonymous identification system ensures that each citizen has only one vote, preventing fraud while providing absolute protection for privacy and personal safety—especially important in countries with a history of political repression.
ddsAI and allddsAI: artificial intelligence serving democracy, providing complete, accurate, neutral, and independent information — not manipulated by any government, media corporation, or interest group.
Imperative mandate with recall: all elected or appointed representatives must abide by the will of the group that elected them and can be replaced at any time if they fail to perform their duties properly.
With absolute respect for traditions, cultures, languages, religions, minority groups, and all opposing viewpoints, DDS protects diversity, it does not eradicate it.
A peaceful, intelligent, safe, and non-violent transfer of power — even in one-party states or those without free elections.

OVERVIEW SUMMARY

Vietnam, with over 100 million people, is at a turning point. The 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (January 2026) consolidated the power of General Secretary To Lam, who is also expected to assume the presidency, marking a shift away from the decades-long tradition of "collective leadership." The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) aims for 10% annual GDP growth between 2026 and 2030, positioning the private sector as the "driving force" of the economy, while the state retains its "leading" role in strategic direction.

At the same time, Vietnam remains a one-party state with no free elections and no system of checks and balances between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The National Assembly—nominally the highest power—is in fact under the total leadership of the Party. Criticism of the Party or the state is considered a criminal offense under Articles 117 and 331 of the Penal Code, resulting in hundreds of political prisoners. Land is state-owned and managed by the people, leading to controversial land expropriation, corruption, and increasing inequality (Gini coefficient of approximately 37.6, with the richest 10% of the population receiving over 30% of national income, while the poorest 10% receive only about 3.2%).

The anti-corruption campaign, while having removed some high-ranking officials, has failed to address the root of the problem: a one-party system lacking independent oversight from outside the Party. Ethnic minorities (such as the Central Highlands community), religious groups not recognized by the state, and the LGBTI community continue to face discrimination and a lack of legal protection.

The DDS program for Vietnam does not advocate for overthrow, violence, or the imposition of Western models. The program proposes a step-by-step transition path, through the parallel development of a network of directly democratic micro-groups—starting at the neighborhood, village, enterprise, and school levels—using ddsAI/allddsAI technology to provide transparent information and organize collective decision-making. Over time, this network will become a parallel governance system that is legitimate, transparent, and more trusted by the general public than existing structures—to the point where the old structures will gradually be replaced naturally and peacefully through the consensus of an overwhelming majority, rather than through confrontation or conflict.

This document presents: (1) a detailed analysis of the current situation in Vietnam by sector; (2) a structured critique of systemic issues; (3) a full DDS program — political, economic, financial, social — with specific solutions; (4) a phased implementation roadmap; (5) expected consequences and benefits, with specific examples.

PART I — ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN VIETNAM (2025-2026)

1.1. Political system: one-party system, centralized power.

Vietnam is a one-party state led by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) since 1930 (its current name since 1976, after the reunification of the country in 1975). The CPV prohibits the formation of other political parties. The National Party Congress, held every five years, is the highest decision-making forum, where approximately 1,600 delegates representing over 5 million party members elect the Central Committee (around 200 members), which in turn elects the Politburo (17-19 members) — the highest de facto power body.

At the 14th National Congress (January 19-25, 2026), General Secretary To Lam — former Minister of Public Security, who took power after the death of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong in August 2024 — was reappointed and is expected to concurrently hold the position of President, an unprecedented concentration of power in decades, breaking the tradition of the "four pillars" (collective leadership among the four highest positions). Under his leadership, the state apparatus has undergone a large-scale reform: the number of ministries has been reduced from 22 to 14, approximately 150,000 positions in the public sector have been cut, and 8 ministries/ministerial-level agencies have been abolished or merged.

The National Assembly, comprising approximately 500 delegates elected every five years, is formally the highest organ of state power, but in reality operates under the comprehensive leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) — with no independent checks and balances between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Questioning the Party's leadership is considered a serious criminal offense.

Critique of DDS: A system in which all power—legislative, executive, judicial, media, security—is concentrated in the hands of a single institution, however well-intentioned, will always lead to: (a) a lack of self-correction mechanisms; (b) unchecked abuse of power; and (c) the exclusion of millions of citizens' voices from decisions that directly affect their lives. This is not a moral judgment about people within the system, but a structural observation, based on the logic and history of every system of monopoly of power, in any country in the world.

1.2. Economy: High growth but dependent and unbalanced

Vietnam achieved an impressive GDP growth rate of 8% in 2025, exceeding the average target of 6.5-7% set for the 2021-2025 period (a target that was not actually achieved due to global shocks and trade disruptions). For the 2026-2030 period, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has set an ambitious target: a minimum GDP growth rate of 10% per year, with a new model placing the private sector as the "driving force" while the state maintains a "leading role" in strategic direction. The budget deficit is projected to increase to around 5% of GDP (compared to over 3% in the previous period) to finance infrastructure and development investments, including large-scale railway and energy projects.

However, Vietnam's traditional growth model—based on cheap labor and exports—is facing serious pressure from high US tariffs on Vietnamese goods, threatening revenue from its largest export market. The To Lam administration has stated its intention to transform the model into an upper-middle-income economy by 2030, focusing on innovation, efficiency, and technology.

Regarding ownership structure: all land in Vietnam is state-owned (“public ownership”); individuals and businesses are only granted “land use rights,” not ownership rights. The five largest banks are all state-owned. Sectors with a very high degree of state ownership and control include: agriculture, electricity production and transmission, infrastructure, industrial production, oil and gas, and telecommunications. The program to “privatize” state-owned enterprises (SOEs) — with a list of 124 SOEs slated for privatization according to Decision 908/QD-TTg of 2020 — has not progressed as planned, and SOEs still control key activities for the current and future development of the economy.

Criticism of DDS: A top-down, imposed 10% annual growth target, in a context where land is not privately owned, major banks are state-controlled, and strategic economic decisions are in the hands of a small group of Party leaders, creates structural risk: the benefits of growth may concentrate in a minority connected to power, while the risks (public debt, land loss, environmental pollution due to rapid industrialization) fall on ordinary people, especially in rural areas.

1.3. Corruption and the "anti-corruption" campaign

The anti-corruption campaign (“burning the furnace”), intensified during the time of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong and continued under To Lam, has led to the prosecution of many high-ranking officials, including members of the Politburo. However, according to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI 2026) analysis, this campaign has caused an estimated $2.5 billion in undisbursed foreign aid between 2022 and 2024, while also serving as a tool for internal power struggles without addressing the systemic corruption inherent in a one-party structure without external oversight.

Criticism of DDS: Fighting corruption “from within” by the very organization holding all the power — without a free press, without an independent judiciary, without political opposition, without citizens having the right to demand budget transparency — logically cannot eradicate corruption at its root, because the mechanisms that create corruption (monopoly of power + lack of transparency + lack of public accountability) remain intact. This is a structural problem, not a problem of individual leaders.

1.4. Land, environment, and increasing inequality.

Land expropriation for economic development projects is often accompanied by violence, allegations of corruption, and prosecutions of those who oppose it. Because the land is state-owned, people—especially farmers and ethnic minority communities—lack effective legal tools to protect their homes and livelihoods when local authorities decide to expropriate land for businesses or infrastructure projects.

A prime and tragic example: in June 2023, two groups of about 40 armed individuals attacked two communes in Dak Lak province, killing nine people. Authorities called this "terrorism," allegedly carried out by members of indigenous Montagnard ethnic minority groups; nearly 100 people were arrested. Notably, a senior government official later acknowledged that the incident stemmed in part from poor state management and high levels of inequality in the region.

Economic inequality continues to widen during the transition to a market economy: the Gini coefficient is approximately 37.6; the richest 10% account for about 30.2% of total national income, while the poorest 10% receive only about 3.2%. The gap between rich and poor, urban and rural, and between regions, ethnic groups, and genders continues to pose a major challenge to long-term social stability.

Criticism of DDS: The 2023 Dak Lak incident is clear evidence of the consequences of a system lacking a legal, peaceful, and effective channel for disadvantaged communities to express their grievances and be heard. Without direct democracy and a genuine consultation mechanism before land expropriation, accumulated grievances can erupt into violence—causing harm to both minority communities and the state. DDS precisely proposes this type of direct consultation and decision-making mechanism as a safety valve for similar tensions in the future.

1.5. Freedom of speech, human rights, and political prisoners

According to Human Rights Watch's 2026 World Report, in 2025, the Vietnamese government tightened its crackdown on dissidents as the Communist Party of Vietnam consolidated its power. The government targeted individuals who used social media to raise issues of religious freedom, land rights, indigenous rights, and corruption, arresting and prosecuting them.

Articles 117 (“propaganda against the state”) and 331 (“abusing democratic freedoms to infringe upon state interests”) of the Penal Code are widely used to convict activists and bloggers with lengthy sentences. As of 2025, Vietnam held more than 160 political prisoners, and at least 40 others were arrested for criticizing the government. A specific example: activist Trinh Ba Phuong, already serving a 10-year sentence, was sentenced to an additional 11 years for criticizing the Party from prison; his father, land rights activist Trinh Ba Khiem, was placed under lockdown by local authorities and prevented from leaving his home.

Notably, despite such a poor human rights record, in October 2025 Vietnam was elected to the United Nations Human Rights Council for the 2026-2028 term through a secret ballot.

1.6. Religious freedom and religious minorities

The Vietnamese government restricts religious activity through laws requiring registration and oversight. Religious groups must be approved and registered by the state, operating under the management of state-controlled boards. Unrecognized religious groups are labeled "heretical." The police monitor, harass, and sometimes violently suppress religious groups operating outside of state-recognized organizations. Followers of independent religious groups face threats, intrusive surveillance, public criticism, pretrial detention, interrogation, and coercion to renounce their faith.

1.7. Rights of ethnic minorities, women, and the LGBTI community

Although ethnic minorities are nominally represented within the Communist Party of Vietnam, they are rarely promoted to high-ranking positions, and Party leaders hinder effective advocacy on issues affecting minority communities. Members of ethnic and religious minority groups face discrimination in society, and some local officials restrict their access to education and employment.

Vietnam has enacted policies to promote women's political participation, but in reality, women's interests are still not fully represented in government.

For the LGBTI community: marriage and family laws do not recognize same-sex marriage. The lack of provisions on adoption, healthcare, or property rights for unmarried couples means the LGBTI community continues to face discrimination. Transgender rights remain unclear; gender recognition legislation has been delayed for 10 years.

DDS's Commitment: DDS does not impose any moral, religious, or cultural stances on issues such as marriage, family, or gender identity. These are issues that each society, through its own direct democratic microgroups, has the right and responsibility to discuss and decide upon at its own pace, values, and consensus—fully informed by allddsAI in a neutral manner, without external pressure in any direction. What DDS guarantees is that no individual or group—whether majority or minority—is deprived of fundamental rights to bodily safety, freedom from violence, or freedom from imprisonment for their identity, while society finds its own consensus over time.

PART II — THE DDS POLITICAL PROGRAM FOR VIETNAM

2.1. Guiding principle: peaceful transition, non-confrontational, bottom-up approach.

DDS does not propose a “revolution” in the sense of violent overthrow, does not call for street protests confronting security forces, and does not demand that the Communist Party of Vietnam “dissolve itself.” History shows that such paths often lead to bloodshed, chaos, or the replacement of one dictatorship with another.

Instead, DDS proposes building a parallel network of direct democratic micro-groups—starting at the smallest scale (extended family, neighborhood, village, community group, business, school, agricultural cooperative)—where people voluntarily participate, using ddsAI technology to discuss, be informed, and vote on issues that directly affect their daily lives: prices, land, public services, local environment, children's education, and public health.

This network does not need to declare itself a “political opposition” in the traditional sense—this avoids direct repression under Article 117/331. It can be presented as, and indeed is, a community self-governance tool, a platform for information transparency, a socio-economic mutual aid network. Over time, as millions of citizens participate, become better informed, and become accustomed to making organized decisions about their own affairs, this network will gradually become a real source of power—not because it is waging war against the old structure, but because it operates more effectively, more transparently, and more reliably.

At a mature stage, when the vast majority of the population (e.g., over 60-70%) actively participates in the micro-group network and trusts its decisions more than parallel party-state structures, the formal transfer of power becomes a natural step, widely accepted — including by many members of the Communist Party of Vietnam, who are also citizens, parents, neighbors, and also benefit from a more transparent and equitable system.

2.2. Fractal microgroup model applied to Vietnam

The basic structure of DDS is a fractal microgroup model, expanding exponentially: 1 facilitator → 5 level 1 microgroup members → each of them coordinates 5 others (25 people at level 2) → 125 at level 3 → 625 at level 4, and so on. Applying this to the Vietnamese context:

Level 1 (Neighborhood/Hamlet/Commune): A group of 5-6 adjacent households holds regular meetings (in person or via the ddsAI application) to discuss common issues: environmental sanitation, neighborhood security, electricity and water prices, and minor disputes.
Level 2 (Neighborhood/Village): Representatives from 5 groups (approximately 25-30 households) compile opinions and submit them to the commune/ward level.
Level 3 (Commune/Ward): Representatives from neighborhoods/villages (approximately 125-150 households) discuss commune-level issues: local budget, land planning, schools, and basic healthcare.
Level 4 (District/County): Compilation from communes/wards (approximately 625-750 households or more), identifying inter-commune issues: transportation infrastructure, water resource management, regional development projects.
Provincial and national levels: continue to expand along the same logic, with DDS expert groups (see section 2.4) supporting technical analysis for complex issues (national budget, foreign policy, defense, cross-provincial environment).

The key point: each level does not “order” the lower levels. Information and decisions flow in two directions—from bottom up (requests, opinions, and public voting) and from top down (information, technical analysis from experts and allddsAI, so that lower-level micro-groups have sufficient data when making decisions). Representatives at each level operate under an “imperative mandate”: they must accurately convey the opinions of the group that elected them, cannot make decisions independently, and can be immediately recalled if they fail to do so.

2.3. Triple Anonymity Identification System: Safe for Vietnamese Citizens

This is a crucial factor for Vietnam, where expressing political opinions can lead to arrest under Article 117/331. The DDS system uses three independent, encrypted, and separable codes:

Citizen identification code (private, not public): confirms that each person registers only once, preventing "one person, multiple votes" fraud, but is never publicly linked to that person's specific opinions or votes.
Microgroup participation codes (semi-anonymous): allow a person to participate in discussions and vote within their local group without revealing their true identity to members other than those they choose to trust.
Voting codes (completely anonymous, untraceable): ensure that each person's ballot cannot be traced back to their individual identity, even by the DDS system itself, similar to the "secret ballot" principle in democratic elections, but enhanced by cryptography.

This system is specifically designed to operate securely even in tightly controlled digital surveillance environments: data is end-to-end encrypted, storage is distributed, and microgroups can initially operate entirely offline—for example, in-person meetings with locally scanned and encrypted paper ballots—before aggregated data (containing no identifying information) is synchronized with the wider network.

2.4. ddsAI and allddsAI: Neutral information for Vietnamese citizens

One of the biggest problems in any political system—especially those with tight media control—is that citizens lack access to comprehensive, diverse, and unbiased information to inform their decisions. ddsAI is an artificial intelligence system trained and supervised by independent DDS expert teams, with a single mission: to provide accurate, comprehensive, and well-sourced information, presenting diverse perspectives on all topics—economics, public policy, history, environment, health—in Vietnamese, easily understandable to all educational levels.

allddsAI is the “democratic layer of AI”: multiple independent AI models (not belonging to a single company, government, or media corporation) participate in cross-checking information to minimize the bias of any single AI system. When a microgroup in Vietnam needs to make a decision, for example, about a local land reclamation project, allddsAI will synthesize: official government data, independent analyses, opinions from stakeholders (including those who support and oppose the project), experiences from similar cases in Vietnam and other countries — all presented neutrally, without drawing conclusions on behalf of the user, so that the local people themselves can make the final decision.

For example: Suppose a company proposes building a hydroelectric power plant in a mountainous district, affecting the farmland of 200 ethnic minority households. Under the current system, decisions are typically made at the provincial/central level with limited consultation. Under the DDS system: the village/district-level group receives a neutral report from allddsAI including—estimated economic benefits (jobs, taxes, electricity), environmental impacts, compensation options compared to similar projects domestically and internationally, opinions from independent water resources and sociology experts, and most importantly, alternative options (e.g., distributed solar power that does not require relocation). The group discusses, votes, and their decision—whether conditional approval, rejection, or proposed alternative—is then forwarded to a higher level as a binding request from the people, not a “consultation” that can be disregarded.

2.5. Expert Group and Human Bridge (Ponti Umani)

DDS organizes specialized expert groups (legal, economic, health, environmental, agricultural, technological, educational, international relations) ready to support Vietnamese micro-groups when they need in-depth analysis of a complex technical issue. These experts do not have the authority to make decisions on behalf of the people — their role is to provide information and options, not to impose solutions.

Human Bridges (or “ponte umano”) are volunteer individuals, trained in the DDS methodology, who act as liaisons between local Vietnamese communities, the ddsAI/allddsAI system, and the global DDS network. For Vietnam, Human Bridges can be Vietnamese citizens residing in the country or members of the Vietnamese diaspora (overseas Vietnamese community) who understand the local language, culture, and context, and who possess the ability to connect with international resources and expertise.

2.6. Protection against media manipulation and brainwashing.

A particular challenge in Vietnam is the tightly controlled media environment, where alternative viewpoints are often labeled as “hostile propaganda” or “reactionary forces.” DDS platforms are designed with multiple layers of protection:

Multi-source verification is mandatory: all important information must be presented with at least three independent sources offering different perspectives, allowing users to compare them themselves.
Propaganda language detection: allddsAI is trained to identify and label (not remove, just label for user awareness) common propaganda techniques — whether from the state, businesses, or extremist opposition groups — applying the principle of absolute neutrality to all sides.
Anti-algorithm manipulation: no paid political advertising, no "addictive" algorithms that maximize usage time by amplifying offensive content — the DDS platform's design principles prioritize clarity and calm in discussion.
Distributed and censorship-resistant infrastructure: microcluster data is stored in a distributed manner (no single central server that can be intercepted), with the ability to operate semi-offline when needed.

2.7. Respect the historical role and honest members of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

DDS recognizes that the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) played a crucial historical role in the struggle for independence and national reunification, and that millions of party members are ordinary citizens, many of whom are honest, dedicated, and also desire a more just and prosperous Vietnam. The DDS program does not view party members as “enemies.” On the contrary, grassroots party members—those closest to the community—are often best positioned to become the first micro-group coordinators, bringing credibility and organizational experience to the new network, while directly benefiting from a more transparent, less corrupt system where their own children and relatives will also live better lives.

PART III — DDS ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROGRAM

3.1. Land: From nominal "ownership by the entire people" to genuine, non-transferable collective ownership (NTCO)

The core issue currently is that, theoretically, land is "owned by the entire people," but in reality, the decision-making power regarding its use, conversion, reclamation, and allocation rests with local and central authorities, with very little genuine participation from the people—leading to corruption, unjust land seizures, and, as seen in Dak Lak in 2023, serious social conflict.

DDS – Non-Transferable Collective Ownership (NTCO) solution applied to land in Vietnam:

Any decision to change the land use purpose from agricultural/residential land to industrial/commercial land in a locality must be discussed and voted on beforehand by a local commune/district-level group, with full information from allddsAI regarding benefits, risks, and comparative compensation options.
Establish a “Community Land Fund” in each commune/district: a portion of the value added from land-use conversion (e.g., 30-50%, specifically determined by the local micro-group) is retained in this fund, becoming the non-transferable collective property of the local community, used for reinvestment in local infrastructure, education, and healthcare — it cannot be sold, mortgaged, or transferred outside the community.
For households directly affected: the compensation plan must include at least one of two options chosen by the household itself — compensation with equivalent land in a new location with equivalent or better infrastructure, OR compensation in cash at market price at the time the project is completed (not the price at the time of land acquisition, to avoid a situation where land prices skyrocket after acquisition without the people benefiting).

A specific example — the case of Dak Lak: if the DDS model had been implemented before 2023, decisions on agricultural land allocation, settlement policies for the Kinh people in the Central Highlands, and economic development projects affecting Montagnard communities would all have gone through local micro-groups — including representatives of the ethnic minority communities themselves, with a three-code anonymity system protecting them from retaliation for voicing their opinions. allddsAI will provide historical data on similar land conflicts, successful mediation options elsewhere, and analysis of the region’s specific levels of inequality — creating a valve for peaceful, long-term pressure release, rather than allowing grievances to accumulate for years.

3.2. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privatization: transparency and benefits for the people.

Current problem: the equitization program of 124 state-owned enterprises under Decision 908/QD-TTg (2020) has not met its targets. State-owned enterprises continue to control key sectors (electricity, oil and gas, telecommunications, banking, infrastructure) with limited transparency regarding operational efficiency, executive salaries, and profit allocation.

DDS Solution — Democratically controlled privatization, without selling strategic assets to foreign entities:

For state-owned enterprises on the privatization list that are not in strategic sectors (e.g., some manufacturing, service, and construction enterprises): privatization should be carried out but with a "citizen's share" mechanism — a portion of the shares (e.g., 20-30%) are allocated free of charge or at preferential prices to employees and local residents where the enterprise operates, in the form of shares that cannot be transferred to foreign investors for a certain period (e.g., 10 years), to avoid the situation of "privatizing and then immediately selling to foreign capital" that has occurred in many other transitional countries.
For state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in absolutely strategic sectors (electricity, clean water, core telecommunications, oil and gas, mineral resources, central banks and large state-owned banks, strategic transport infrastructure): apply the NTCO principle — NO privatization to private or foreign entities. Instead, reform governance: the boards of directors of these SOEs must include elected representatives (through the DDS micro-group system, not top-down appointments) from employees and consumers/communities, along with independent technical experts. Financial reports, executive salaries, and large contracts (above a threshold set by the micro-group) must be publicly available in real time on the ddsAI platform, easily understandable to ordinary citizens.
All long-term (over 10 years) foreign loan or resource exploitation concession agreements involving strategic assets must be presented transparently (via allddsAI, with independent analysis of terms, risks, and benefits compared to similar agreements in other countries) and must be agreed upon by a majority of provincial/national-level micro-groups before signing — not solely decided by the Politburo or the Government.

3.3. The 10% Growth Target: Realization and Fair Distribution of Benefits

DDS is not opposed to the goal of high economic growth — growth, if distributed equitably, brings real benefits: jobs, income, infrastructure, better public services. The issue is not “growth or no growth,” but “growth for whom, and who bears the risk.”

Growth Dividend Fund: A fixed percentage (e.g., 5-10%, determined by national-level micro-groups through periodic voting) of GDP growth exceeding the baseline target (e.g., the portion of GDP growth exceeding 6% per year) is transferred to a national fund, allocated directly to commune/district-level micro-groups per capita, allowing them to decide on investments in local priorities: schools, health centers, roads, clean water, and support for farmers transitioning to organic/high-tech agriculture.
Infrastructure investments (railways, energy) are financed through a budget deficit of 5% of GDP: all large projects (above a threshold, e.g., $100 million) must publicly disclose detailed bidding documents, contractors, and projected costs compared to actual costs in real time on the DDS platform, with automatic alerts from allddsAI when costs exceed the budget by a certain percentage — a tool to combat losses and cost overruns, a chronic problem for large infrastructure projects in Vietnam and many other countries.
Regarding tariff pressures from the US and dependence on exports: the DDS program proposes establishing groups of economic experts (through the global DDS network) to support Vietnamese SMEs in diversifying export markets (ASEAN, EU, the Middle East, Africa, South America — many of these markets are also implementing corresponding DDS programs, creating a trade network based on reciprocal and fair principles, not solely dependent on a single large market).

3.4. Banking and finance: transparency, combating bad debt, credit for ordinary people.

The five largest banks in Vietnam are state-owned. A common problem in similar systems is that preferential credit tends to flow to large, politically connected businesses, while small businesses, farmers, and workers have difficulty accessing loans at reasonable interest rates.

Establishing "Micro-Group Credit Funds" at each commune/district level, partially funded from the profits of state-owned banks (according to a ratio proposed and voted on by the national micro-group), providing loans at preferential interest rates to farmers, micro-enterprises, and cooperatives, based on participatory credit assessments by the local community (those who know who is trustworthy) combined with data analysis from ddsAI — reducing reliance on informal credit, a major problem in rural Vietnam.
Publicly disclosing a list of large loans (above a certain threshold) from state-owned banks, including the borrower and the purpose of use (excluding sensitive personal information), aims to reduce the risk of "relationship-based credit" leading to systemic bad debt.

3.5. Agriculture, Industrialization and Environment

Vietnam is undergoing rapid industrialization, leading to the conversion of agricultural land, pollution of rivers, soil, and air in many industrial zones, and pressure on coastal ecosystems (especially the Mekong Delta, which is facing serious saltwater intrusion and land subsidence due to excessive groundwater extraction).

Every new or expanded industrial park must have a “Community Environmental Monitoring Council” elected by local micro-groups, with access to real-time environmental monitoring data (water quality, air quality) publicly available on the DDS platform — not just periodic reports submitted by businesses themselves.
For the Mekong Delta: the regional micro-groups of provinces (Can Tho, An Giang, Dong Thap, Ca Mau, etc.) need to be connected into a specialized inter-provincial micro-group network, as issues such as groundwater exploitation, saltwater intrusion, and upstream Mekong River dam management extend beyond the administrative boundaries of a single province. AllddsAI provides regional and international data (including data from Laos, Cambodia, and China on upstream hydropower dams) to enable these inter-provincial micro-groups to formulate common requests to the national level regarding water policy and regional diplomacy.
Supporting agricultural transformation: The Growth Benefit Sharing Fund (section 3.3) can be used by agricultural microgroups to invest in water-saving irrigation technologies, salt-tolerant crop varieties, and organic/VietGAP certification to increase the export value of agricultural products — with technical support from the global DDS agricultural expert group.

PART IV — DDS SOCIAL PROGRAM

4.1. Freedom of speech and the decriminalization of peaceful dissent

The current issue: Articles 117 and 331 of the Criminal Code have been used to imprison over 160 political prisoners, primarily for peaceful activities on social media related to land, religion, indigenous rights, and corruption.

DDS does not demand the immediate repeal of these laws (which is beyond the capabilities of a civil society network and could provoke a stronger repressive reaction). Instead, the program focuses on building a parallel discussion space, protected by cryptographic anonymity, where citizens can discuss “sensitive” issues (land, local corruption, quality of public services) in the form of practical “community problem-solving,” not abstract “criticism of the regime”—reducing the risk of prosecution while still achieving the substantive goal: issues are raised, analyzed, and resolved.

The international DDS Human Bridge Network can engage in diplomatic lobbying, through existing human rights dialogue channels (including Vietnam's recent election to the UN Human Rights Council for 2026-2028, creating diplomatic leverage: higher international expectations come with this position), to advocate for a review of cases using Article 117/331 against peaceful land and environmental rights activists — within the framework of “improving human rights records to be worthy of a role on the Human Rights Council,” a framework more readily accepted than direct confrontation.
In specific cases like the Trinh Ba Phuong and Trinh Ba Khiem families, the DDS network can provide international legal support (through DDS legal expert groups) and transparent international communication (through multilingual DDS channels) to bring these specific cases to international attention in a factual and unexaggerated manner — contributing to moderate diplomatic pressure.

4.2. Religious freedom: from “mandatory registration” to “recognition of diversity”

The current problem: religious groups that are not registered or recognized by the state are considered "heretical sects," and their followers are monitored, harassed, and forced to abandon their faith.

DDS microgroups at the commune/district level, where religious diversity exists (including groups not officially recognized), can serve as practical intermediaries: documenting (via ddsAI, anonymously if necessary) specific cases of harassment, comparing them with current Vietnamese law on freedom of religion (the Vietnamese Constitution nominally guarantees freedom of religion), and creating factual, legally sound dossiers for Human Bridges to use in dialogue with local authorities — many cases of religious harassment in Vietnam occur at the local level, sometimes exceeding official central directives, and can be resolved at the local level with attention and clear documentation.
allddsAI provides microgroups with neutral information about the various religions present in Vietnam (Buddhism, Catholicism, Protestantism, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Islam, indigenous religions of ethnic minorities, etc.), helping to reduce prejudice and misunderstandings between communities — a crucial step towards reducing social stigma against religious minority groups.

4.3. Ethnic minorities: genuine representation and protection of identity

The current problem is that ethnic minorities are nominally "represented" within the Communist Party of Vietnam but rarely hold high positions, and issues affecting them specifically (land, language, indigenous religion) are often not effectively addressed.

In the DDS microgroup model, each ethnic minority community (Central Highlands — Ede, Bana, Gia Rai, Mnong, Sedang...; Northern mountainous region — Tay, Thai, Muong, Hmong, Dao...; Khmer in the Mekong Delta; Cham in Central Vietnam, etc.) organizes itself into microgroups according to its actual residential area, with the right to use its own language in internal discussions — ddsAI supports real-time multilingual translation between Vietnamese and ethnic minority languages, ensuring that information from allddsAI reaches everyone, not just fluent Vietnamese speakers.
Issues directly related to land, forests, and traditional resources of ethnic minority communities (especially concerning land law and forest land use rights) must involve the mandatory participation and substantive veto power (not just formal consultation) of those community groups before any changes are implemented — directly applying the lessons from the Dak Lak case of 2023.
Community Land Funds (section 3.1) in ethnic minority areas can be used to invest in bilingual schools (Vietnamese + ethnic language), preserve traditional festivals and crafts, and develop community-based tourism owned and managed by the ethnic minorities themselves — not by outside businesses.

4.4. Women: From Policy on Paper to Substantive Participation

In the DDS microgroup structure, there are no top-down “quotas” for female participation rates—but the three-code anonymity system removes a major barrier for women in many rural communities: fear of speaking publicly, especially on issues such as domestic violence, inequality in family land distribution, or access to education for girls. Women can participate in discussions and vote through the ddsAI platform without speaking in person to the group if they prefer not to.
allddsAI provides accessible information on women's legal rights in Vietnam (family and marriage law, land law related to joint ownership rights of spouses, labor law) in simple language, helping rural women understand their rights—which are often obscured by local customs that are incompatible with current law.

4.5. The LGBTI community: a safe and informative space, without imposition.

As stated in section 1.7, DDS does not impose a position on same-sex marriage or gender recognition — this is a decision for Vietnamese society, made through its own process.

However, DDS's triple-code anonymity system creates a safe space where LGBTI community members in Vietnam can access accurate medical, legal, and psychological information from ddsAI (e.g., about health, issues related to gender transition, or simply feeling less alone) without fear of identity disclosure in a society still rife with prejudice.
When local microgroups, at their own pace and with their own consensus, decide to discuss issues such as property rights for non-marital couples or adoption, allddsAI will provide neutral information on experiences and outcomes in other countries (both in favor of and against legal changes), allowing the microgroups to decide for themselves whether to bring policy requests to a higher level.

4.6. Education, health, and basic public services

Each sub-group at the commune/district level has the right to use a portion of the Growth Benefit Sharing Fund (section 3.3) to address specific local issues related to schools (repairs, equipment, scholarships for poor students) and health centers (medicines, personnel) — based on the community's own assessment, not an equal top-down allocation that disregards the differing needs between regions.
ddsAI provides accurate public health information (disease prevention, nutrition, reproductive health) in local languages, which is especially important in remote areas where access to formal health services is limited.

PART V — IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP

The roadmap below is a guideline, not a rigid plan — the actual pace will depend on the level of voluntary participation of the people, the actual political conditions, and the lessons learned from each stage. The overarching principle: no stage relies on confrontation, violence, or overt violation of current Vietnamese law — all activities are designed to be legal or tolerated in gray areas (community self-governance, cooperatives, civil technology platforms).

Stage	Time	Main activities	Expected results
1. Start	Years 1-2	Establish pilot micro-groups (neighborhoods/hamlets) at level 1 in 5-10 diverse provinces (urban, rural, mountainous, ethnic minority, Mekong Delta). Deploy ddsAI in Vietnamese and major ethnic minority languages. Train the first Human Bridge program.	Several thousand to tens of thousands of people participate directly; the first concrete success stories (e.g., resolving a minor land dispute through informed dialogue).
2. Expand horizontally	Years 2-4	Expand micro-groups to levels 2 and 3 (neighborhoods/villages, communes/wards) in pilot areas. Establish the first Community Land Funds and Micro-Group Credit Funds, small in scale and completely transparent to build credibility. Expand geographical scope to more provinces/cities.	Hundreds of thousands to millions of people participated; the first local funds proved effective through concrete projects (schools, small roads repaired thanks to transparent community funding).
3. Strengthening and linking inter-provincial cooperation.	Years 4-7	Connecting micro-groups at level 4 (district/county) and inter-provincial levels for regional issues (Mekong Delta, Central Highlands). A global network of DDS experts supporting major economic issues (export diversification, agricultural technology). Advocating for human rights diplomacy based on Vietnam's role in the UN Human Rights Council.	With tens of millions of participants, the DDS network is widely recognized as a reliable source of information and problem-solving, independent of both the state and biased foreign news sources.
4. Majority Consensus and Institutional Transformation	Ages 7-12+	When the majority of the population actively participates in and trusts the DDS network more than parallel structures, national-level microgroups organize votes on formalizing the role of the DDS system within the legal framework (e.g., the National Assembly recognizes the binding nature of local microgroup decisions on specific issues such as land and local budgets). This process unfolds gradually, sector by sector, level by level, entirely through consensus, with no single "movement point."	The parallel governance system peacefully and legally became the official governance system, supported by an overwhelming majority — including many former members of the Communist Party of Vietnam, who were also active members of micro-groups.

PART VI — EXPECTED CONSEQUENCES AND BENEFITS

6.1. Specific economic benefits

Reducing losses in large-scale infrastructure projects (railways, energy) through real-time public monitoring — international experience shows that transparent bidding can reduce cost overruns by 10-30% depending on the project, equivalent to billions of USD in savings on large-scale projects within the 2026-2030 infrastructure investment program.
Micro-credit funds help reduce reliance on informal lending in rural areas, which often carries interest rates of 100-300% per year, freeing up real income for millions of farming households and micro-enterprises.
Diversifying export markets through the global DDS network reduces the risk of shocks from a single large market (e.g., US tariffs), increasing the resilience of the Vietnamese economy to international trade fluctuations.
The Community Land Fund creates a stable source of local investment capital, not entirely dependent on central government budget allocation, allowing communes/districts to address urgent issues (dilapidated schools, lack of clean water) more quickly, which previously would have taken years to resolve through the top-down budget allocation process.

6.2. Specific Social Benefits

Reducing the risk of violent land conflicts like the one in Dak Lak in 2023 through mandatory consultation mechanisms and the substantive veto power of affected communities — shifting grievances from “silent accumulation leading to explosion” to “continuous, step-by-step resolution”.
Improving Vietnam's human rights record in a substantive way (not just on paper) creates diplomatic and economic advantages: major trading partners (EU, some international organizations) are increasingly linking trade preferences to human rights and environmental criteria — substantive improvements could open up more trade and investment opportunities.
Preserving and promoting the cultural and linguistic identity of ethnic minorities through self-governing resources (Community Land Fund, bilingual schools), reducing the risk of cultural erosion due to migration and forced assimilation over time.
Increase social trust—a factor identified by many economic studies as directly correlated with sustainable long-term economic growth—through increased transparency of information and genuine citizen participation in decisions that affect their lives.

6.3. Specific Political and Governance Benefits

Providing the Communist Party of Vietnam with an information "safety valve" from the grassroots: central leaders often lack accurate information about the actual situation at the local level due to embellished reports from multiple administrative levels. The DDS micro-group network—if viewed as an information tool, not a political opponent—could become a valuable source of factual data for central leaders to make better decisions, reducing the risk of incidents like the Dak Lak case.
Reducing the burden on top-down anti-corruption campaigns: when transparency regarding contracts, budgets, and projects becomes a habit at the grassroots level (through micro-groups), petty corruption at the local level—which directly affects people's daily lives more than major cases at the central level—will naturally decrease, without the need for a new "purge" every few years.
Creating a new generation of grassroots leaders (micro-team coordinators) selected based on practical competence and community trust, with mandatory mandate and the right to dismiss — a “candidate pool” for future local management positions, with transparent backgrounds and proven credibility.

6.4. Conclusion: DDS's commitment to Vietnam

Vietnam has a long history of resilience, adaptation, and self-determination—from its struggle for independence to the "Doi Moi" reforms that fundamentally transformed its economy in a few decades. The DDS program does not propose an external path, but rather a set of tools—micro-groups, ddsAI/allddsAI, anonymous identification, non-transferable collective ownership—that enable Vietnamese people, with their own values, culture, and goals, to solve specific problems themselves, from a small land dispute in a mountainous village to major decisions about the country's economic future.

DDS pledges that Vietnam's wealth—its land, resources, strategic infrastructure, and above all, the labor and intellect of its more than 100 million people—will forever belong to the Vietnamese people. No power, domestic or foreign, has the right to decide their future for them. This is not an abstract promise, but a concrete design principle, codified into the very technical and legal structure of the DDS system, and consistently applied in every country where DDS operates.

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DirectDemocracyS — Program for Vietnam — 2026