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DirectDemocracyS Italia.

POPULAR REFERENDUM VOTE OF: March 22 and 23, 2026

Attention, Italians residing abroad will vote according to specific rules, before the scheduled dates. For all information, consult the Laws and regulations on the various official institutional websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior!

SUBJECT OF THE REFERENDUM: JURISDICTIONAL SYSTEM AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DISCIPLINARY COURT

INVITATION.

First, we invite all our users to join our various analysis and internal voting groups (there are dozens, perhaps hundreds). There, you can make suggestions, organize discussions, even across groups. After the actual voting, you can participate in the detailed analysis of the results and all subsequent activities. To find one or more groups, after logging in, go to this link (visible and usable only after logging in):

https://free.directdemocracys.org///free.directdemocracys.org/utility/extensions/submit-ticket

As the subject, write: 2026 Referendum on Justice Reform, leave the default priority of 3 normal, and as the message, write "analysis and internal voting groups." You will receive all the instructions via private message in the social media area of our website. As always, the groups have been divided into various subgroups, with varying numbers of users, also based on the different types, to allow everyone to participate. We look forward to seeing you there. PS: If you already know the group, or if you have already been invited by one of the members, simply accept the invitation and you will automatically be added to the respective group.

CONTENTS OF THIS MATERIAL.

This material contains: an explanation of the questions, voting methods, the official position of DirectDemocracyS, which we recommend when referring to the NOI vote, the general results of the internal voting test, an official position that we do not recommend, but which contains personal reasons to justify a personal official position, compared to the recommended one, the IO vote. At the end, you'll find what will actually change in the Constitution, along with related predictions if the YES vote wins.

Here is some information:

Below you will find a free, independent, neutral and complete explanation of the referendum on justice in Italy on 22-23 March 2026 , with:

๐Ÿ—ณ๏ธ What is this referendum?

It is a confirmatory constitutional referendum (Article 138 of the Constitution).

๐Ÿ‘‰ It does not propose a new law:
it serves to confirm or reject a reform already approved by Parliament .

The vote will be on profound changes to the organization of the judiciary.

โš–๏ธ Which parts of the Constitution are being amended?

The reform concerns several articles of Part II of the Constitution:

These articles regulate:

๐Ÿงฉ The main changes expected

1) Separation of careers between judges and prosecutors

Today in Italy:

๐Ÿ‘‰ They belong to the same "order" of magistrates
๐Ÿ‘‰ They can change roles during their career

With the reform:

๐Ÿ“Œ Declared objective: greater impartiality of the judge

2) Two Superior Councils of the Judiciary

Today:

With the reform:

They are needed for appointments, careers and discipline.

3) High Disciplinary Court for Magistrates

New constitutional body that:

Objective: greater independence and transparency.

4) Drawing of lots for some members of the self-governing bodies

Some of the members would not be elected but drawn by lot.

๐Ÿ‘‰ It serves to reduce the power of the "currents" within the judiciary

โš–๏ธ How the Italian system works today

Italy has a unique model in Europe:

๐Ÿ‘‰ Unitary judiciary

This system was born after fascism, to avoid government interference in justice.

๐ŸŒ How other countries behave

๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ท France

๐Ÿ‡ฉ๐Ÿ‡ช Germany

๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ United States

๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ธ Spain

๐Ÿ‘‰ Italy is one of the few countries with completely independent PMs.

๐Ÿ”ฅ Arguments from YES supporters

According to those in favor:

โœ”๏ธ Improved impartiality of the judge

The judge will not be part of the same body as the prosecution.

โœ”๏ธ More balance between prosecution and defense

The process would become more โ€œequalโ€.

โœ”๏ธ Reduction of internal currents

Lottery and separation limit the logic of power.

โœ”๏ธ Greater disciplinary responsibility

With a dedicated courtyard.

โš ๏ธ Arguments of the NO supporters

According to those who are against:

โŒ Risk of weakening the PMs

Separated from the judges, they could become more controllable.

โŒ Possible political influence

If prosecutors lost their autonomy, the government could influence investigations.

โŒ Fragmentation of the judiciary

Two distinct systems might not coordinate as well.

โŒ Lottery = less representativeness

It reduces internal democratic choice.

๐Ÿ”ฎ Expected consequences if YES wins

Short term

Medium term

Possible positive effects:

Possible side effects:

Long term

Two opposite scenarios:

  1. More balanced and transparent system
  2. Weakening of investigations into corruption and strong powers

Both plausible.

๐Ÿ”ฎ Expected consequences if NO wins

Short term

Medium term

Long term

The system is maintained:

โœ”๏ธ Strong independence of magistrates
โŒ Criticisms of slowness and self-referentiality

๐Ÿง  What does this referendum really determine?

It's not just technical.

It's about the fundamental question:

๐Ÿ‘‰ Who should supervise justice?

โš–๏ธ An important political fact

The vote is also seen as a political test of the government.

News on the 2026 justice referendum

According to international analysis, the country is divided and participation could be decisive.

๐Ÿงพ In short, ultra-neutral

๐Ÿ‘‰ The referendum does not decide "whether justice will be better or worse."

Decides:

what kind of judiciary should Italy have.

If YES wins

If NO wins

Separate careers

Unitary judiciary

Two CSMs

A CSM

New disciplinary court

Current system

Greater impartiality possible

Greater independence

Possible politicization of PM

Institutional continuity

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Official location of our system, which we recommend to all our users.

๐Ÿ—ณ๏ธ Recommended position: Vote YES in the referendum on justice (March 22โ€“23, 2026)

DirectDemocracyS never imposes individual political choices.
Every citizen is free and sovereign in their vote.

However, after technical, institutional and comparative analysis, we believe that this reform represents at least two steps forward โ€“ although it also contains a possible step backwards .

For this reason, we recommend voting YES , while acknowledging its limitations and risks.

โš–๏ธ What really changes with the reform

The referendum confirms or rejects a constitutional law already approved by Parliament.

If YES passes:

If NO wins, the current system will remain.

The reform modifies the organization of the judiciary but does not abolish its formal autonomy.

โœ… Why we recommend YES โ€” The two steps forward

1) Greater clarity between the prosecution and the judge

In the current Italian system:

The reform introduces a structural separation.

This strengthens the judge's perception of impartiality, because:

๐Ÿ‘‰ the accuser no longer belongs to the same career as the judge
๐Ÿ‘‰ the risk of "cultural proximity" between the two functions is reduced
๐Ÿ‘‰ the process appears more balanced between prosecution and defense

Many supporters see this as a way to make the judge more โ€œthird-partyโ€.

In several Western systems, the prosecutor is already separate from the judge.

2) Reduction of the power of internal currents

The Italian judiciary is strongly influenced by internal organized groups.

The reform introduces:

The stated goal is to limit corporate logic and internal politics.

From a systemic perspective, this is an attemptโ€”imperfect but concreteโ€”to reduce undemocratic concentrations of power.

3) Greater transparency of responsibilities

Separating functions also means:

An understandable system is always a more democratically controllable system.

โš ๏ธ The potential step back

The main risk is only one but significant:

๐Ÿ”ด Possible weakening of the public prosecutor's independence

According to critics:

Part of the judiciary fears that the reform will make prosecutors less autonomous.

This is the most delicate point.

๐ŸŒ How other countries behave

There is no single model.

Many democracies adopt different systems:

โ€œSeparateโ€ model (similar to the reform)

Here the prosecution is separate from the judge and often closer to the executive.

โ€œUnitaryโ€ model (similar to today's Italy)

The reform brings Italy closer to the prevailing Western models.

๐Ÿ”Ž Likely consequences if YES wins

In the short term

โœ” greater institutional clarity
โœ” profound organizational changes
โœ” complex transition phase
โœ” strong political and judicial debate

In the medium term

โœ” processes perceived as more balanced
โœ” reduction of the weight of the currents
โœ” possible greater efficiency

โš ๏ธ but also:

๐Ÿ”Ž Consequences if NO wins

โœ” the current structure remains
โœ” no structural reform
โœ” institutional continuity

But also:

๐Ÿง  Why DirectDemocracyS recommends YES

In our view:

๐Ÿ‘‰ An imperfect improvement is preferable to immobility
๐Ÿ‘‰ A system can be corrected later
๐Ÿ‘‰ Separation of powers and transparency are fundamental principles
๐Ÿ‘‰ Reducing uncontrolled concentrations of power is always positive

In other words:

Two steps forward, one step back โ€” but the general direction is progress.

๐Ÿงฉ Our additional proposals (beyond the reform)

Reform alone is not enough.

DirectDemocracyS also believes that:

These measures are not included in the referendum but are essential for truly fair justice.

๐Ÿ—๏ธ Conclusion

๐Ÿ‘‰ Voting is free and personal.
๐Ÿ‘‰ There is no forced choice.
๐Ÿ‘‰ Both options have pros and cons.

However, we believe that:

โœ”๏ธ Voting YES means attempting a concrete improvement of the system

โŒ Voting NO means maintaining the current situation without changes

We recommend YES because it represents an imperfect but real advancement .

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RESULTS OF INTERNAL VOTING TESTS IN VARIOUS GROUPS

We inform you that from the voting tests in the various groups involved, on our platforms, a simple majority of us, approximately 52% if the vote were held today, would vote yes.

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For those who aren't convinced, here are some conclusions from the discussions so far, to advise those who want to vote NO.

Below is a possible official position consistent with the principles, style and philosophy of DirectDemocracyS , formulated as follows:

โœ” independent
โœ” non-propagandistic
โœ” non-imposing
โœ” technically motivated
โœ” useful to inform your users
โœ” consistent with your public justice material

๐Ÿ›๏ธ Recommended location for DirectDemocracyS

Referendum on Justice โ€” Italy, March 22-23, 2026

โš ๏ธ Fundamental premise (mandatory in our style)

DirectDemocracyS never forces anyone to vote.

โžก๏ธ Everyone must make free, informed, and responsible decisions.

Our role is:

โœ” provide independent analysis
โœ” explain real consequences
โœ” propose better solutions
โœ” advise, not command

This is consistent with the principle of informed and continuous popular sovereignty of your system.

๐Ÿง  DirectDemocracyS Principles on Justice

From our public materials a very clear line emerges:

1) Justice must be equal for all

โ€œJustice means the application of the law, which must be equal for all.โ€

2) Laws must be ethically correct and improvable

If they don't work, they need to be changed โ€” but in a rational way.

3) Real responsibility for those who exercise power

No institutional impunity.

4) Control from below, not from the elite

Sovereignty belongs to citizens, not corporations.

โš–๏ธ DirectDemocracyS analysis of the referendum

This referendum is not just about technical aspects.

๐Ÿ‘‰ It's about the balance between three powers:

๐Ÿ” Central point: separation of careers

The referendum mainly introduces:

โžก๏ธ separation between judges and public prosecutors

DirectDemocracyS Interpretation

Separation itself is NOT automatically good or bad.

It depends on:

๐Ÿงญ Recommended location (consistent with DirectDemocracyS)

๐Ÿ‘‰ Precautionary advice: Lean towards NO

Not to defend the status quo, but because:

โ— The reform is incomplete according to DirectDemocracyS standards

Introduces structural changes WITHOUT:

โŒ true direct control of citizens
โŒ effective personal responsibility of magistrates
โŒ total transparency โŒ
radical anti-corruption systems
โŒ reform of the efficiency of justice

๐Ÿงจ Risks identified

1) Possible weakening of the independence of investigations

By separating PMs, the risk of them becoming influenced by political power increases.

๐Ÿ‘‰ DirectDemocracyS is opposed to any concentration of power not controlled by the people.

2) No real democratic control from below

The reform modifies internal organs of the judiciary, but:

โŒ It does not increase the power of citizens
โŒ It does not introduce public scrutiny
โŒ It does not hold those who make mistakes directly accountable

3) It does not solve the main problems of justice

For DirectDemocracyS the real problems are:

The reform does NOT intervene decisively on these aspects.

4) Lottery and new bodies do not guarantee quality

The draw reduces the currents, but does not guarantee competence or responsibility.

โš–๏ธ Why NOT automatically support YES

DirectDemocracyS does not support reforms in principle:

โŒ partial
โŒ non-systemic
โŒ not designed for the global collective good
โŒ driven by traditional logics of power

Our approach is always:

๐Ÿ‘‰ Change everything that doesn't really work, not just some parts.

๐ŸŸข Because it's not an ideological NO

It doesn't mean defending the current system.

๐Ÿ‘‰ It means considering the reform insufficient or potentially risky.

DirectDemocracyS aims for radically better solutions, not compromises.

๐Ÿงฉ DirectDemocracyS proposals on justice

Based on our material and philosophy, a coherent reform would include:

โœ” 1) Real personal responsibility of magistrates

Consistent with the principle of universal responsibility.

โœ” 2) Certain procedural times

Slow justice is injustice.

Possible tools:

โœ” 3) Real civic control

Not political, but popular.

Examples consistent with DirectDemocracyS:

โœ” 4) Effective equality before the law

Not just formal.

๐Ÿ‘‰ Equal rights for rich and poor
๐Ÿ‘‰ Defense accessible to all

โœ” 5) Complete depoliticization of justice

Neither political domination nor internal corporatism.

โœ” 6) Radical simplification of the laws

The more complex the laws are:

โžก๏ธ The more they become tools for a few experts
, the less they are right for everyone.

โœ” 7) Intelligent use of technology

Consistent with your model:

๐Ÿ“ข Recommended message to our users

โœ” Balanced DirectDemocracyS formula

๐Ÿ‘‰ "Voting is free and personal.
We don't impose anything. We recommend you evaluate carefully."

๐Ÿงพ Official summary version possible

๐Ÿ‘‰ DirectDemocracyS believes that the reform:

โžก๏ธ For this reason, we prudently suggest voting against (NO), while respecting every individual choice.

โญ Final sentence in DirectDemocracyS style

๐Ÿ‘‰ Don't vote to defend a system.
๐Ÿ‘‰ Don't vote to follow propaganda.
๐Ÿ‘‰ Vote for what you think is best for the collective good.

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๐Ÿง  Strategic analysis of long-term political implications

Referendum on Justice โ€” Italy, March 22-23, 2026

This analysis does not only concern the technical reform of the judiciary, but the systemic effects on power, democracy and institutional balances in the long term (10โ€“30 years).

๐Ÿ›๏ธ 1) Redefining the balance of state powers

The referendum affects the relationship between:

In a democracy, this balance is the true โ€œcoreโ€ of the system.

If YES wins

๐Ÿ‘‰ Possible rebalancing in favor of elected politics
๐Ÿ‘‰ Reduction of the "counter-power" role of the judiciary
๐Ÿ‘‰ System more similar to other Western democracies

In the long term this can lead to:

โœ” greater governability
โœ” less institutional conflict
โŒ less ability to block abuses of power

If NO wins

๐Ÿ‘‰ The autonomous role of the judiciary is implicitly strengthened
๐Ÿ‘‰ Politics remains more exposed to judicial control

Over time:

โœ” strong anti-corruption capacity
โŒ risk of permanent conflicts between powers

โš–๏ธ 2) Transformation of the role of the public prosecutor

The PM is a strategic figure: he decides which crimes to prosecute and against whom.

Scenario YES

Separation of careers = possible evolution of the PM towards a more โ€œaccusatoryโ€ model.

In the long term:

But also:

โŒ risk of indirect dependence on political power
โŒ selectivity in investigations on sensitive topics

Scenario NO

The PM remains part of the same order as the judges.

In the long term:

โœ” strong autonomy
โœ” continuity of the Italian model

But:

โŒ persistence of criticisms of corporatism
โŒ difficulty of future reforms

๐Ÿงฉ 3) Effects on the political stability of the country

Justice directly impacts the life of governments.

With YES

Possible reduction of:

๐Ÿ‘‰ This can foster more stable and long-lasting governments.

But in the long run:

โŒ risk of reduced accountability of public decision-makers

With the NO

The current system remains capable of strongly influencing politics.

โœ” strong control over abuse
โŒ chronic instability possible

๐ŸŒ 4) International positioning of Italy

Judicial institutions influence:

If YES wins

Italy is moving closer to the prevailing European and Western models.

Possible long-term effects:

โœ” greater perceived legal predictability
โœ” improved economic attractiveness โœ” reduction of the image of an
โ€œ anomalous โ€ system

If NO wins

Italy maintains a unique and highly autonomous model.

This can be seen as:

โœ” guarantee of
independence โŒ institutional rigidity

๐Ÿงฌ 5) Impact on citizens' trust in the State

Trust is the most important political capital.

Scenario YES

If the reform produces processes perceived as fairer:

๐Ÿ‘‰ Confidence can increase.

If suspicions of political control arise:

๐Ÿ‘‰ Confidence can drop dramatically.

Scenario NO

Confidence remains tied to current problems:

๐Ÿงฑ 6) Effects on the future of institutional reforms

This referendum could become a precedent.

If YES wins

๐Ÿ‘‰ It demonstrates that profound constitutional reforms are politically possible.

In the long term it can pave the way for:

If NO wins

๐Ÿ‘‰ A sign that the country is reluctant to structural change.

Possible consequence:

๐Ÿ”„ 7) Evolution of democracy in the long term

The basic question is:

๐Ÿ‘‰ Who controls who?

๐ŸŒ 8) Strategic implications for innovative movements like DirectDemocracyS

For systems based on direct democracy and widespread accountability:

With YES

โœ” more โ€œmodularโ€ and reformable system
โœ” reduction of corporate concentrations
โœ” greater space for new models

But:

โŒ beware of any centralizing drifts

With the NO

โœ” strong autonomy of existing institutional powers
โŒ greater difficulty in introducing radical innovations

๐Ÿ”ฎ 9) More realistic scenario at 20 years old

Whatever the outcome:

๐Ÿ‘‰ The Italian judicial system will continue to evolve.

The real decisive variable will be:

There is no definitive reform.

๐Ÿงพ Strategic conclusion

This referendum does not just decide on a technical reorganization.

It decides the long-term direction of the State:

โœ” If YES wins

โžก๏ธ Evolution towards a more separate, flexible and politically balanced system
โžก๏ธ Risk of reduced investigative autonomy

โœ” If NO wins

โžก๏ธ Continuity of a highly independent model
โžก๏ธ Risk of immobility and institutional conflicts

โญ Final summary

๐Ÿ‘‰ It's not a clash between "just justice" and "wrong justice."
๐Ÿ‘‰ It's a choice between two models of balance of power.

Both can work well or poorly depending on how they are managed over time.

CONCLUSIONS: WHAT REALLY CHANGES THE CONTENT OF THE CONSTITUTION IF THE YES VOTE WINS?

Below you will find a clear, technical, yet understandable explanation of the constitutional changes indicated in the text, that is, what would actually change if the YES vote were to win in the referendum of March 22-23, 2026.

๐Ÿ›๏ธ First of all: what does amending the Constitution mean?

These are not ordinary laws.

๐Ÿ‘‰ The "rules of the Italian justice system" are changing.

In particular, the current model of a unitary judiciary (judges and public prosecutors in the same rank) is being overcome.

๐Ÿ‘‘ Article 87, paragraph 10 โ€” President of the Republic and CSM

Today

The President of the Republic chairs the Superior Council of the Judiciary.

๐Ÿ‘‰ There is currently only one CSM.

The President is the guarantor of the independence of the judiciary.

After the reform

With two separate Councils (judges and prosecutors), the text needs to be updated.

The role of the President does not change, but:

๐Ÿ‘‰ will have to preside over a system with two self-governing bodies.

In essence:

โœ” technical modification
โœ” no direct impact on citizens
โœ” serves to maintain constitutional coherence

โš–๏ธ Article 102, paragraph 1 โ€” Who exercises the judicial function

Today

The Constitution speaks generically of โ€œordinary magistratesโ€.

It does not constitutionally distinguish between:

After the reform

The distinction between: is introduced or strengthened:

๐Ÿ‘‰ This means that the separation becomes constitutional, not just organizational.

This is one of the most important changes.

๐Ÿ›๏ธ Article 104 โ€” Superior Council of the Judiciary

Today

There is a single CSM for all magistrates.

The CSM:

After the reform

Two separate Councils are created:

1๏ธ โƒฃ one for judges
2๏ธ โƒฃ one for prosecutors

Practical consequences:

โœ” separate self-government
โœ” completely autonomous careers
โœ” end of the institutional unity of the judiciary

This is the heart of the reform.

๐Ÿง‘ โ€ โš–๏ธ Article 105 โ€” Careers and discipline of magistrates

Today

The single CSM manages:

for all magistrates.

After the reform

A new institution is born:

โš–๏ธ High Disciplinary Court

This court will deal with disciplinary sanctions.

Furthermore:

๐Ÿ‘‰ The idea is to separate those who govern careers from those who judge conduct.

๐Ÿ‘ฅ Article 106, paragraph 3 โ€” Honorary magistrates

Honorary magistrates are non-career judges (e.g. justices of the peace).

Today

The law is built on the unitary model of the judiciary.

After the reform

A technical adjustment is needed.

๐Ÿ‘‰ The role of honorary magistrates remains unchanged.

The text is updated to fit the new separate structure.

๐Ÿ” Article 107, paragraph 1 โ€” Unity of the judiciary

This is one of the most symbolic articles.

Today

The Constitution states that magistrates:

๐Ÿ‘‰ They are distinguished only by functions, not by career

It is possible to switch between PM and judge (with limitations).

This expresses the principle of unity of the judiciary.

After the reform

The separation becomes constitutional.

๐Ÿ‘‰ It will no longer be possible to change functions during your career.

Two distinct professional paths are created right from the start.

Consequence:

โœ” greater specialization
โœ” greater distance between prosecution and judge
โŒ loss of fungibility between roles

๐Ÿข Article 110, paragraph 1 โ€” Minister of Justice

Today

The Minister of Justice has authority over the organization of services.

It does not intervene in the decisions of the magistrates, but manages:

After the reform

A technical update is needed because there are now two self-government systems.

๐Ÿ‘‰ This does not automatically mean more political power over justice.

It serves to coordinate the new structure.

๐Ÿง  What emerges overall

If YES wins:

๐Ÿ”ด End of the unitary judiciary provided for by the Constitution

Two parallel systems are born:

each with:

โš–๏ธ What does NOT change directly

โŒ The crimes do not change
โŒ The courts do not change
โŒ The Penal Code does not change
โŒ The rights of citizens in the process do not change

Only the constitutional organization of the judiciary is changed.

๐ŸŒ Why this reform is considered "structural"

Because it affects the way the State exercises justice.

It is comparable to:

๐Ÿงพ Ultra-clear synthesis

๐Ÿ‘‰ Today: a single judiciary with different functions
๐Ÿ‘‰ After the YES: two separate judiciaries by Constitution

I wait

Today

After the YES

Single CSM

โœ”

โŒ

Two CSMs

โŒ

โœ”

PMโ†”judge transition

โœ”

โŒ

High Disciplinary Court

โŒ

โœ”

Unitary judiciary

โœ”

โŒ

CONCLUSIONS.

Voting no would essentially mean being satisfied with how justice is working in Italy, and we know full well that it doesn't work quickly or even properly.

In recommending a yes vote, we don't consider it a sufficient change, but it is at least an attempt to change things. If modified by eliminating the lottery (stupid, unsuccessful, and potentially disastrous) and introducing the election of every institution, judge, jury, and all the parties involved, and by fully integrating, in the future, all our structural proposals designed for the common good, it could represent the start of something truly better.

For further details, please contact our specialist groups and our groups dedicated to this referendum. We encourage you to go vote and let everyone know your opinion!